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The New Technology and
Multi-National Cooperation
In the firm belief that the lawyer, as a leader in his com-
munity, has an affirmative duty to keep himself in-
formed of the events which are shaping the times, the
Minnesota Law Review offers the following contribution
by Dean Louis H. Mayo. The Article provides a provoca-
tive analysis of the nature and implications of several sig-
nificant trends in world affairs. These trends are of im-
portance to the lawyer because it is in this context that
legal-policy decisions are to be made. The author's major
emphasis centers on the effect of modern technological
and scientific developments on international cooperation.
Some of such innovations require multi-national coopera-
tion for their effective use while in other situations their
use may produce tension and conflict. Dean Mayo con-
cludes that we must condition our thinking to the major
social movements, including scientific and technological
advances, if we are to progress toward world peace.
Louis H. Mayo*
I.
Today we are experiencing what truly may be called a revolu-
tionary transformation in human affairs. Lawyers and other pro-
fessional groups, in particular those members participating in vari-
ous legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that an under-
standing of the major forces moving men and nations is an indis-
pensable requisite to intelligent decision. A number of setbacks in
the Cold War struggle has generated an uneasy feeling that the
United States and other Western nations have lost the initiative in
the international arena to the Soviets.' Some political analysts as-
*Dean, Graduate School of Public Law, and Professor of Law, George
Washington University.
1. See Lippmann, The Folly of Despair, Wash. Post, June 13, 1961, p.
A13, cols. 1-3. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 1, wherein
Senator Jackson (D. Wash.) accuses the State Department of failing to look
ahead and of a tendency to react rather than take the initiative in foreign
affairs; Roberts, U.S. Position Falls to New Low, Wash. Post, Sept. 23,
1961, p. A9, cols. 1-3.
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sert that this unhappy situation is in large part due to our mis-
reading of the dynamics of change, to our inability or refusal to
distinguish between the Communist political movement and the
legitimate social unrest now rocking much of the world.2
Constructive adjustment3 to major socio-political problems in
the contemporary international context requires an accurate under-
standing of the nature and implications of the following significant
trends: The persistent spread of industrialism;4 the surging de-
mands of the pre-industrial nations, both for a higher standard of
living5 and for nationalistic identification and prestige;6 the ex-
ponential growth of scientific knowledge and its technological ap-
plications;7 the massive rate of population increase;' the growing
2. See Lippmann, supra note 1.
3. "For the rich nations the problem is to live constructively with the
historic transformation going on in the underdeveloped world, not to try to
'solve' it." BLACK, THE DIPLOMACY Op ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 23
(1960).
4. See KERR, DUNLOP, HARBISON & MYERS, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUS-
TRIAL MAN (1960) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIALISM]. Along with the
spread of industrialization and the rapid increase in population is the trend
toward urbanization. The problems arising from this movement are stag-
gering. See also N.Y. Times, July 17, 1961, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov.
27, 1961, p. 31, col. 1. This drift to urban areas is a world wide phenome-
non. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 34, col. 5. The urbanization trend has
some immediate and direct implications upon our constitutional law doc-
trine in connection with the suits for reapportionment of congressional dis-
tricts now before the courts. See Brown vs. Baker: The Supreme Court
Finds Itself in an Awkward Situation, 134 SCIENCE 1677 (1961).
5. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3.
6. Id. at 14. Black indicates that nationalism is a greater motive force
among leaders of the newly emerging nations than the drive to escape
poverty.
7. See Fischer, Saturday Rev., Dec. 10, 1960, pp. 15, 16; Kistiakowsky,
Science and Foreign Affairs, 16 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 114 (1960).
See also STRAusz-HuPE, KINTNER & PossoNY, A FORwARD STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA 81 (1961). The potentially far ranging implications of automa-
tion and automatic data processing are discussed by MICHAEL, CYBERNA-
TION: THE SILENT CONQUEST (1962) (A Report to the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions). President Kennedy has stated that the
adverse effect of the new technology (automation) on desired employment
level poses "the major domestic challenge of the Sixties." N.Y. Times, Feb.
15, 1962, p. 1, cols. 3-4. At the international level it has been predicted
that the eventual impact of telemetry will be greater than that of atomic
energy. See Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1961, p. CIO, col. 3.
8. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7; VOGT, PEOPLE: CHALLENGE TO
SURVIVAL 224 (1960) ("The population explosion is both more dangerous
and more immediate than the H-bomb."); Symposium-Population Con-
trol, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 377 (1960).
James Reston, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1961, p. 22, col. 3, criticizes Presi-
dent Kennedy for taking the position on the one hand that vast outlays for
foreign aid are essential to our foreign policy and on the other that what
recipient nations do with respect to their population is not our concern.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1961, p. C49, col. 8; KAHN, ON THERMONU-
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interdependence of nations;9 the increasing role of the state in po-
litical, social and business affairs; 10 and the rapidly expanding
research function" accompanied by an accelerating rate of infor-
mation accumulation.' 2 Casual reflection suggests that most of
these trends are technologically based. Even the "population ex-
plosion" is essentially the result of improved medical services and
sanitation measures which have reduced infant mortality and in-
creased longevity.'3
The foregoing trends are in part the cause and in part the effect
of the total context of conditioning factors in which contemporary
legal-policy decisions must be made. The swift movement of
events and the complicated interrelationships among factor-vari-
ables have induced a pessimistic view of our ability to maintain
a stable social equilibrium.'4 Questions have been raised, for ex-
ample, as to the capacity of the traditional democratically struc-
tured state to cope with the infinitely complex socio-political-tech-
CLEAR WAR 570-71 (1961). See also Miller, Some Observations on the Po-
litical Economy of Population Growth, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 614
(1960).
A much more optimistic view than that found with the preceding com-
mentators is expressed by the Secretary General of the U.S.S.R. Academy
of Sciences. See Fedorov, Too Many People in the World?, Saturday Rev.,
Feb. 17, 1962, pp. 17, 18. Fedorov asserts that "man's resourcefulness
must not be discounted," and that "we have only begun to mine our
riches."
9. See, e.g., EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 8 (Rev. ed.
1948); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 479 (1950).
10. See, e.g., HEILBRONER, THm FUTmRE AS I-IsTORY 112, 186 (1960);
INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 40. See also What Kind of Econ-
omy Is It?, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1961 (Magazine), p. 7 (Interviews with
members of Council of Economic Advisers); Chase, Will Growth Increase
Federal Control?, Atlantic, Aug. 1961, p. 32.
11. DUPRE & LAKOPF, SCIENCE AND THE NATION 171 (1962). With
reference to the spectacular increase in the number of people engaged in
research and development activities, see A Scientific Society-The Begin-
nings, by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, AEC Release, Dec. 27, 1961. See also Weinberg, Big Science
-Marvel or Menace?, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1961 (Magazine), p. 15.
12. See HEILBRONER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 157; Toynbee, Educa-
tion: The Long View, Saturday Rev., Nov. 19, 1960, p. 60. See also state-
ments of H. W. Dubach of the National Oceanographic Data Center with
respect to the rapid accumulation of information and his plea for a "whole
new philosophy in data processing, one that will provide 'qualitative evalu-
ation' of the facts obtained." Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1961, p. CIO, col. 4;
THEOBALD, THE CHALLENGE OF ABUNDANCE 157 (1961).
13. See Miller, supra note 8, at 621; LUNDBERO, CAN SCIENCE SAVE
Us? 46 (1961).
14. See Frank, Atomic Arms and Pre-Atomic Man, 17 BULL. ATOM-
IC SCIENTISTS 361 (1961). See also Boulding, The Prevention of World
War 11I, 38 VA. Q. REV. 1, 3 (1962); RITNER, THE SOCIETY OF SPACE
2-3 (1961).
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nological problems on the current international scene. 5 Our situ-
ation has been characterized as a "time of trial" for the democrat-
ic process.' 6 Some observers feel that a crisis has arisen in our de-
cision-making procedures, that our political machinery is not ade-
quate to render rapid decisional response within acceptable limits
of error.' In a sense, the recognition that the democratic process
is in for a "time of trial" is equivalent to saying that we have be-
come disillusioned with the idea of inevitable progress and the ra-
tionality of man.' Perhaps we have become somewhat impatient
with the inability of our traditional political machinery to "solve"
the terribly complex problems with which we are faced.'9 Nev-
ertheless, we have been reluctant to dismiss the democratic tenet of
widely shared decision-making power though many of our major
decisions must be made by relatively few men."0 It should be ap-
parent, however, that the revolutionary transformations in social,
economic, and political structure now taking place in the world
will require much more complicated policy making and organi-
zational forms in arriving at workable arrangements: 2' internally,
between the traditional public and private sectors,22 and exter-
nally, in connection with relationships between the United States
and other nations.23
15. See GOALS FOR AMERICANS 64 (1960) (Report of the President's
Commission on National Goals).
16. Ibid.
17. See STRAUsz-HuPE, KINTNER & PossoNy, op. cit. supra note 7, at
362. See also MEDAlUS, CoUNTDowN FOR DECISION 277 (1961). Delay in
policy decision over the Berlin issue led to inflammatory propaganda on
both sides which served only to confuse, not clarify the problem, and gave
the impression of uncertainty on the part of the U.S. See Reston, N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1961, p. E8, col. 4. However, the "Crisis Center" estab-
lished by the Kennedy Administration for the purpose of coping with non-
military emergencies was soon discontinued as an unsatisfactory mechanism
for the function to be performed. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1962, p. 14, cols.
5-7. Senator Jackson (D. Wash.), who has made a study of the national
policy making machinery, does not find that our traditional governmental
structure is outmoded or at a disadvantage in comparison with totali-
tarian regimes. He stresses the need for good people rather than govern-
mental reorganization. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
18. See HEILBRONER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 55.
19. See Kraft, The Grand Design Takes Shape, Harper's, Feb. 1962, p.
31.
20. See Snow, Whether We Live or Die, Life, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 90;
Medaris, Compromise Versus Decision, 28 J.B.A.D.C. 367, 373-74 (1961).
21. See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 550; STRAUSZ-HUPE, KINTNER
& PossoNY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 359-60; see also Shulman, The Real
Nature of the Soviet Challenge, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1961, p. 5, col. 4.
22. See MICHAEL et at., PROPOSED STUDIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF
PEACEFUL SPACE ACTIVITIES 22-24 (1961) (Report prepared for the Com-
mittee on Long-Range Studies of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration by the Brookings Institution).
23. See MICHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 25-27.
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While no single factor can be deemed decisive in shaping the
current socio-political context,24 certainly scientific and techno-
logical advance has been one of the more influential factors. Un-
fortunately, this movement has brought increased international
military dangers and risks of violence along with its huge material
benefits and conveniencesY So too, science and technology has
been employed unevenly, though not necessarily discriminatorily,
in showering most of its bounty on the mature industrial societies.
The "Revolution in Rising Expectations" now poses to some that
which is the fundamental issue of our time: how to manage the
conflict and tension gradually arising between the "have's" and the
"have-not" nations.26 Technology is most certainly a key factor
in the "Cold War" struggle,s' and the possibility that a techno-
logical break-through at any time can create an unmanageable
crisis's is a thought which should sober us all.
Further, the new technology is placing an unprecedented strain
upon traditional social structures.29 Hence, the central question is
raised concerning its intelligent management.3" Such handling
24. "The fully developed industrial society is too dynamic and complex
to yield to the dictates of a single imperative; and a theory about it which
yields sole place to any single imperative is too simple to do more than
mislead." INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 290. See also RosTow,
THE STAGES o ECONOMIC GRowTH 126-31, 136, 144, 150 (1960); Siegel,
Scientific Discovery, Invention, and Cultural Environment, 4 PAT. TRADE
M. & COPYRIGHT J. 233, 244 (1960).
25. See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 537.
26. See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 570; see also Goldman, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1962, (Book Review), p. 1 (a review of WARD, THE RICH
NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS (1962)); Stillman & Pfaff, A New Start
in Foreign Policy, Harper's, Jan. 1961, p. 33.
17. See STRAusz-HUPE, KINTNER & PossoNY, op. cit. supra note 7, at
93. Paradoxically, at the same time the tension between East and West
was rising over Berlin, Soviet physicians and scientists were exchanging
research experience on a "friendly competitive" basis in New York. Rusk,
New Tools in Medicine, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1961, p. 49, cols. 1-2. Also
at this time James M. Landis, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, was
negotiating a commercial airline pact with the U.S.S.R. for New York to
Moscow runs to commence in the spring of 1962. N.Y. Times, July 29,
1961, p. C38, col. 5.
28. See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 575. And consider the statement
of M.I.T. Professor David Frisch: "While an incomplete test ban agreement
would be only a very small start, we must be willing to be modest because
we are dealing in very low probabilities of long-term survival." N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1961, p. El0, cols. 4-5.
29. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3-4; BErTTELHIM, THE IN-
FORMED HEART: AUTONOMY IN A MASS AGE 105 (1960).
30. "The control of technology-to make it serve rather than dictate the
development of man and society-is by all odds the most important of the
issues raised by technology." SmRAusz-Hu'E, KINTNER & PossoNY, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 80. See MEDARIS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 245; PIEL,
SCIENCE IN THE CAUSE OF MAN 78 (1961); BRONK, FOREWARD TO NA-
1962]
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may depend upon whether technological development is viewed as
the ultimate "determinism,"'" as a creative tool susceptible to ex-
tensive freedom of utilization,"2 or possibly as a hard pressing
trend which can to some extent be manipulated under certain con-
ditions." But whatever its nature, technological development and
achievement is clearly a criterion of increasing importance in in-
ternational affairs."
Concern over the possible tragic consequences of an uncontrolled
technology is sometimes expressed by a plea for the intelligent ap-
plication of this extraordinary force to the satisfaction of legitimate
human needs and aspirations. 5 Yet, in order to cope effectively
with the complications arising out of this development, a new or-
der of thinking will be required. 6 Consequently, professionals
with the requisite skills for handling the complex problems of fu-
ture years must somehow be produced if disaster is to be avoided.37
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC
RADIATION at iii (1956).
31. See STRAusz-HuPE, KINTNER & PossoNy, op. cit. supra note 7, at
66-67. The authors, in a brief though interesting discussion of this no-
tion, indicate that the U.S.S.R. intellectuals and even some of our schol-
ars view "technological causation" as the "ultimate reality," and there-
fore superior to any previous brand of determinism. It is asserted that
"Technological Man" is the ideal image or model of human development
under the Soviet and Communist China political concepts.
32. This appears to be the position of STRAUsz-HuPE, KINTNER & Pos-
SONY, op. cit. supra note 7, in ch. 4, "The Technological Factor."
33. The function of the technological factor in the larger framework
of spreading industrialism is discussed from various standpoints in INDUS-
TRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, and in RosTow, op. cit. supra note 24.
34. See STRAUsz-HuPE, KINTNER & POSSONY, op. cit. supra note 7, at
63, 67.
35. See MEDARIS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 247. As a sample of the op-
timistic viewpoint consider the statement of George B. Kistiakowsky (for-
mer special assistant for Science and Technology for President Eisenhow-
er): "We can use science and technology to achieve the humanistic goals
of our free society." Kistiakowsky, Science and Foreign Affairs, 16 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 114, 116 (1960). See also MELMAN, THE PEACE
RACE (1961), proposing that the United States employ its immense produc-
tive capacities to bring economic development with freedom to under-
privileged countries.
36. See, e.g., Chase, Principles for the Nuclear Age, Saturday Rev.,
May 6, 1961, p. 32; Houghton, The Challenge to Intellectual Leadership
in Recent American Foreign Policy, 36 SOCIAL SCIENCE 167 (1961); Res-
ton, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1961, p. E8, col. 4; Haskins, Technology, Sci-
ence and American Foreign Policy, 40 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 224 (1962) (con-
sidering needs for cross-disciplinary efforts).
37. See, e.g., STRAusz-HuPE, KINTNER & PossoN, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 87, wherein it is stated that there is urgent need to train a whole
generation of "integrators" in order to have available persons capable of
coping with the new "technological environment." "I think it will demand
a new breed of public servant." Kistiakowsky, supra note 35, at 116. A
paper presented to the American Political Science Association Convention,
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On the positive side, we might inquire whether the new tech-
nology has not also provided the methodology, techniques and
devices by which the problems it has created can be acceptably
managed if not solved.38 There is some evidence of a more gen-
eral adoption of the scientific approach to policy making, that is,
to the systematic development of the analysis of trends and con-
ditioning factors, to the clarification of goal-objectives, to greater
resourcefulness in the invention of alternative courses of action,
to the skills of "model" construction and the prediction of conse-
quences flowing from a given policy course, and to the evalua-
tion of consequences against goal-values in terms of gains and
losses.3 9 But the recognition of the need for such improved policy
formulation, particularly to "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.4 0 In a complicated mil-
Sept. 8, 1961, by Professor Robert Gilpin on Civil-Science Relations in the
United States, suggested that the lawyer may be losing his highly promi-
nent role in policy decisions to the scientist. See also Graham, Why are
the Russians Going to the Moon?, Saturday Rev., Jan. 6, 1962, p. 80.
Graham indicates that the engineers have long enjoyed many special privi-
leges in the U.S.S.R.: "[An engineering degree, similar to a law degree in
the United States, has been regarded as excellent preparation for important
administrative posts in the party or government." Yale University's new
engineering program apparently proposes to take note of the new policy
decision role of engineers and scientists and intends to make the modern
engineer the "middleman between science and society." N.Y. Times, Nov.
7, 1961, p. 35, col. 1.
38. For example, the authors of A Forward Strategy For America
state that: "The same technology which is creating these problems is also
capable of producing means toward their solution. . . .The resources
that are made available by technology include methods of mastering
it." STRAUSz-HUPE, KINTNER & POSSONY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 67.
39. To the effect that there is a need for a scientific rather than a le-
galistic-moralistic orientation, that the scientific mode of thought has so far
made relatively little headway in social affairs, but that the scientific orien-
tation is now in the ascendancy, see LUNDBERG, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 5, 25, 43. For a highly suggestive discussion of new methodologies in
the legal-policy field, see Lasswell, The Scientific Study of International Re-
lations, in 1958 THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAms 1, 28:
The strategy of inquiry is making evident the connections between
scientific thinking and other ways of using the mind in problem solv-
ing. I have mentioned thinking in terms of goal, trend, science, pro-
jection and policy. As perfected, a world survey will summarize par-
ticular sequences of events in world affairs, and provide a continuing
audit of the state of scientific knowledge. The key propositions in
theories of the world decision-process will be faced at regular inter-
vals by all the data obtained at every observational standpoint and
by the application of every procedure at the disposal of the learned
world.
40. See, e.g., KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 579. STRAusz-HuPE, KiNT-
NER & POSSONY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 384-85, strongly endorse "con-
tingency planning" although they acknowledge that while the Depart-
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itary-political problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditioning factors, the ap-
praisal of major trends, the necessity for estimating the conse-
quences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of danger has prompted the use of so-
phisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analy-
sis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equip-
ment.41 But these tools for analyzing decisional processes and
for actual decision making can be effective only in so far as
the governmental political machinery is adapted to utilize such
modem technological innovations.
An improved decisional structure must stress the predictive com-
ponent of the policy making process wherein a "model" of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed for the pur-
pose of testing projected alternative courses of action in terms of
predicted effects flowing therefrom.42 Hence, the "model" com-
ponent refers to facts, postulated facts, trends, conditions, and to
the interrelationship of such factor-variables rather than to the
preference or goal-value component of the decisional process. It
is through such "models" that responses and reactions to given
postulated situations can be tentatively determined. Emphasis is
laid on this point for the reason that some of our more able ob-
ment of Defense agrees, the Department of State feels that its problems
are too complex for this type of planning to serve a useful purpose.
41. Significant strides are currently being made both in the utilization
of and planning for automatic data processing and electronic computer
calculation installations in numerous governmental activities. See Bergami-
ni, Government by Computers?, The Reporter, Aug. 17, 1961, p. 21.
STAUSZ-HUPE, KINTNER & PossoNY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 79, state:
Until recently, the physical sciences have held the limelight in techno-
logical progress. It seems probable that the greatest advances will
henceforth be made in the life sciences and ultimately in the social
sciences. The biological sciences are revealing unexpected relationships
with physics and mathematics; and the latter enter increasingly close
relationships with chemistry and neurophysiology. The trends of sci-
entific inquiry are leading toward deeper knowledge of life. The study
of neuropsychology and cybernetics-the use of knowledge and the
control of human behavior-is linked to the development of computing
machines and, ultimately, of "thinking machines."
For a cautionary statement, consider Sears, Man and His Habitat, 17
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIsTs 322 (1961):
So far as our widely held faith that technology will release us from
the traditional obligations and limitations on human behavior is con-
cerned, we ought to remind ourselves that the more elaborate a
system of technology and the more complete our dependence upon
it, the more vulnerable we are to the slightest miscarriage.
42. For a general discussion of "models" in the legal-policy decisional
context, see Mayo, The New Technology and National Goals: Some Impli-
cations For Legal-Policy Decision Making, 37 No=n DAME LAW. 33
(1961).
MULTI-NATIONAL COOPERATION
servers have suggested that many Soviet successes in the interna-
tional arena have resulted from the employment of a superior
"model of change."' 3 In other words, the U.S.S.R. policy makers
have, in some instances, been better judges, for example, of the
probable responses of the emerging countries to certain types of
stimuli and incentives than have the nations of the non-Com-
munist West.4"
In reviewing the major forces shaping the conditions of the in-
ternational socio-political context today it is clear that they are in
large part influenced by the technological factor. On the other
hand, "law" is also a conditioning factor, and such trends, includ-
ing technological advance, though more or less irreversible in di-
rection during this present era, are not so persistent as to be
wholly unresponsive to outside influences, including legal stand-
ards and institutions. 45 It would appear, however, that opportuni-
ties for bringing a higher degree of order and justice into the in-
ternational arena will depend in large measure upon how well
policy makers understand such conditions and trends since this
must be the first stage of exerting effective influence and control
over their effects.
II.
The contemporary international instability is reflected in a re-
appraising attitude toward the effectiveness of our governmental
decisional machinery for meeting the problems arising from the
new technology. Such questions as the following persist: Why
cannot these magnificent scientific achievements be devoted to
43. STRAUSZ-HUPE, KINTNER & POSSONY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 386,
404; BLACK op. Cit. supra note 3, at 23, 35.
44.
The essential characteristic of Soviet dynamism is that it transcends
the plane of nation-state relations, and is closely bound to anticipated
changes within the social systems it is dealing with. The central con-
ception of Soviet policy, and the distinctive source of its dynamism,
is that the world is in a process of transition; that our social order
is no longer effective in the changing environment, and is therefore in
a process of disintegration and replacement ....
The Soviet approach to national power is a deeply political one.
That is to say, it depends for its effectiveness not upon the auto-
matic effect of any of the conventional components of power, but
upon the skill and the insight with which these are used to relate un-
derlying forces and attitudes in the world to Soviet interests.
Shulman, The Real Nature of the Soviet Challenge, N.Y. Times, July 16,
1961, (Magazine), p. 5, 42.
45. See BISHOP, The International Rule of Law, POST WAR THmNK-
ING ABOUT THE RULE op LAW 553 (1961); FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANG-
INO SOCIETY ch. 1 (1959); Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TUL. L.
REv. 787 (1959).
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civilized needs and uses?46 Why cannot the United States put its
highly developed science and technology to more effective use in
the international arena so as to encourage greater cooperative ef-
forts among nations or stimulate non-violent competition in areas
wherein such competition accrues to the general benefit of man-
kind? A confident answer is difficult to supply but the importance
of the questions would seem to justify a preliminary inquiry into
the matter.
Scientific, technological, and industrial development appear to
be relatively independent of political system,47 although a close
relationship does apparently exist between the rate of tech-
nological change and the degree of general social-political in-
stability. Writing in 1946 on the impact of air transportation on
stability and progress in international relations and the "problem
of change," Professor Quincy Wright asserted that the changes in
conditions which most insistently demand social and political adap-
tations are scientific discoveries and technological inventions.4 8
He continued:
The course of science and of civilization in the past forty years is but
an epitome of their course in world history. In general the history of
science and technology from earliest times has been cumulative and
progressive while the history of culture and civilization has been os-
cillating and unpredictable. Civilizations have risen and fallen. Each
has had periods of uncertainty, of progress, of confusion, and of de-
cline. Frequently, when science and technology have progressed the
most rapidly as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries world poli-
tics has been the most chaotic and bloody. Our own period illustrates
such a relation. Is this relation accidental or causal? A causal relation
is suggested . . . . 49
46. See LUNDBERG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 17; MEDARIS, op. cit. su-
pra note 17, at 247.
47. See INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 279; see also FRIED-
MANN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 267.
48. WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATION-
AL RELATIONS 302 (1954). For a discussion of some of the implications of
modem science and technology for jurisprudential thought, see BUCHANAN,
REDISCOVERING NATURAL LAW (1962).
49. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 48, at 302. See also Wright, Infer-
ences of Science and Technology for International Law, 4 J. PUB. L. 358,
360 (1955):
The very stability and prosperity, to which international law contribut-
ed during the nineteenth century, provided the milieu within which
industrial, political, and technological revolution developed, creating
conditions under which this international law proved no longer ade-
quate. The progress of technology, contributing the airplane, the radio
and radar, and nuclear fission and fusion during our generation, has
made this inadequacy evident to any observer.
But see Siegel, supra note 24, at 233: "As experience, 'scientific discov-
ery' and 'invention' significantly affect, and in turn are influenced by,
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Social stress arises from a breach in the way of thinking which
characterizes periods of rapid technological progress. The new
mode of scientific analysis and technological application is re-
sisted by the more traditional patterns of thought which cling to es-
tablished beliefs, conventions and institutions. This breach, which
always exists to some extent in any active society, is aggravated in
times of rapid scientific change. Where such changes are drastic,
with corresponding impact on socio-political institutions, the gap
may be so extreme as to preclude reconciliation through the nor-
mal mechanisms of change. The rate of technological change dur-
ing the past 20 years has been extraordinary. Consequently, we
have been presented with a wide range of "solutions" designed
to bring our socio-political institutions into conformance with the
technological conditions of this age.50 But at this point the ques-
tion of cause and effect may be raised: Cannot a good case be
made for the proposition that rapid technological change is likely
to result from serious socio-political stress as the experience of the
World War II period would seem amply to demonstrate?51 A more
adequate rationale would probably postulate an element of inter-
action between technological advance and socio-political stress
with the quality of both being shaped by the nature of the strife.52
Again, Professor Wright has suggested that
international peace and security requires a centralization of institu-
tions of information, education, regulation, and control at a rate pro-
portional to the development of economic and cultural interdepend-
ence among the nations and of vulnerability of each to destructive at-
tack by others. 53
Many observers, while agreeing with this sentiment, might con-
sider the possibility of effective international control so unrealistic
at present that reliance must be placed on less ambitious tech-
niques to maintain a non-violent, if uneasy, co-existence. "
the larger cultural environment. A common mistake is to overlook their
roles in the real world as 'effects' and to regard them as 'causes' only."
50. See CLARK & SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (1958).
See also Chase, Principles for the Nuclear Age, Saturday Rev., May 6,
1961, p. 32.
51. On the stimulation of technological development by war, see
WIENER, THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS 148 (1954).
52. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, A SHORT HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 701
(1961), wherein the authors suggest that the interaction of technology with
other social forces has not as yet been subject to a definitive analysis.
53. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 48, at xi.
54. See Jones, World Peace Through Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 1300 (1960),
wherein the author suggests an "evolutionary" approach to international
agreement, and recommends that the necessity for agreement and coopera-
tive participation with respect to certain technically based activities such
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Recognizing the vast diversity of social and political structure
in the world community which constantly threatens its equilibri-
um, Professor Friedmann, in his treatise on Law in a Changing
Society, notes that the alternative is not necessarily between a
fragmented international society based on national sovereignty and
an international society based on a Supreme Universal world law
with concomitant enforcement authority.55 He sees another line
of more probable development:
A third alternative, spurred by social developments and international
tensions of the post-war period, is the emergence of several interna-
tional orders, overcoming the age of national sovereignty, but dividing
the world into several legal systems, governed by different principles
and linked with each other at best by loose rules of mutual tolerance,
at worst by deep antagonisms which only the mutual fear of destruc-
tion keeps from bursting out into open war.56
Friedmann finds that progress toward a legal organization for all
mankind has been almost entirely confined in the post-World War
II period to those areas in which vital interests and standards of
participating nations diverge but little.57 Since cultural patterns dif-
fer so markedly among nations, it seems only natural to Fried-
mann that the most important recent developments in interna-
tional arrangements have occurred through regional or functional
grouping.5" But does the hypothesis that an intelligent applica-
tion of the technological factor will lead to more effective efforts
toward international cooperation gain any support from Fried-
mann's analysis? In concluding his discussion, he states:
In international co-operative law, the degree of conformity in political
and social structure depends on the type of co-operation. Generally,
technical agreements and organizations are independent of social struc-
ture and therefore still possible on a universal scale. Where such co-
operation demands a broad similarity of economic and social organi-
zation or principles, it will be essentially confined to States that agree
on these matters.59
Friedmann's conclusion that certain technical matters provide a
means of gaining near universal agreement offers some small en-
couragement. But his qualification that departure from the purely
as international civil aviation provides a means by which a policy of
gradualism can take hold.
55. FRIEDMANN, Op. cit. supra note 45, at 468.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 474, cites as examples the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
58. Ibid.
59. Id. at 467.
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technical-which is more or less independent of social and politi-
cal structure-immediately arouses a diversity of viewpoints root-
ed in cultural differences, relegates agreement on most important
matters to nations of similar social and political outlook, and
thereby severely dims prospects for developing technology to of-
fer constructive means for gaining international consent. It may
be questioned, however, whether the small list of successful tech-
nically based agreements to which he refers60 is either a true meas-
ure or a very useful way of judging the extent to which technology
has or has not contributed to international understanding and
consent, whether of a formal or informal nature. Certainly some
observers are much more optimistic than is Friedmann concerning
the prospects for greater progress toward international coopera-
tion. A few have even advanced the proposition that science and
technology will supply the major motive force to this movement.61
The insights of an exhaustive trend analysis of technological
advance and its implications for social, political and legal institu-
tions would, in all probability, be most instructive.62 Nevertheless,
certain tentative judgments and 'suggestions for further analysis
may be made on the basis of significant current developments.
The present purpose is to make a limited, preliminary inquiry into
selected contexts wherein the technological factor might lead to
cooperative international efforts, for whatever reason or motivation
(humane desire for a peaceful, civilized existence; mutual con-
venience; commercial gain; sharing of economic burdens; fear of
military attack or even annihilation), and those contexts in which
this factor tends to an opposite result.
Special characteristics of science and technology may encour-
age agreement where mutual gain can be expected and an objec-
tive or relatively objective criterion of judgment is being dealt with.
60. Friedmann in fact gives relatively little attention to strictly tech-
nically based international agreements, possibly for the reason that rela-
tively few tend to fall within this category. In discussing Cooperative In-
ternational Law he not only refers to such organization as WHO and ICAO
but treats in more detail the Internationl Labor Organization (ILO) and
European Coal and Steel Community. FlmDomANN, op. cit. supra note 45,
at 460-67.
61. See Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1962, p. A6, col. 1; Boulding, supra note
14, at 8.
62. See McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Pur-
poses: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order,
1 Am. J. CoMp. L. 24, 29 (1952): See also LASSWELL, THE WORLD REvo-
LUTION op OuR TIME: A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY RESEARCH 39
(1951); FROMM, MAY MAN PREVAIL? 252 (1961): "What matters today
is preserving the world; but in order to preserve it, certain changes have
to be made, and in order to make these changes, historical trends have to
be understood and anticipated."
1962]
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Predictability is then high with respect to the consequences of
agreement or disagreement. Thus in certain contexts physical char-
acteristics limit the effective use of a technological resource.
For example, there is just so much space in the radio spectrum,
and some rational mode of allocation and use is manifestly neces-
sary.63 And there may be an additional favorable aspect to such
scarcity where it involves self-executing or automatic policing fea-
tures. Again, taking radio as an illustration, use by one nation,
free of electro-magnetic interference from other nations, may well
depend upon its non-interference with channels assigned to such
other nations.64 It is also possible that allocation and assignment
of orbits will be necessary as communications and other types of
satellites become operative.65 With respect to the self-policing
functions, the ICAO has been offered as an excellent illus-
tration of a technologically based agreement which has the virtue
of easy enforcement since here, a powerful economic sanction-
denial of access of airlines of the offending nation to territory of
other member nations-is obviously effective in policing the agree-
ment.
66
It often has been stated that the most pressing problem of our
era is to find an effective arrangement through disarmament or
other means of preventing the destruction of civilization.67 Many
observers suggest that the new nuclear terror constitutes the most
powerful motivation-fear of annihilation-which has ever existed
for bringing about institutions of international peaceful coopera-
tion. Friedmann says:
The only serious justification for any hope that the deeply divided and
antagonistic nations and power blocs of the world may merge their
63. See North American Regional Broadcasting, Agreement and Final
Protocol, signed at Washington, Nov. 15, 1950 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office).
64. Unfortunately, the international political situation has established lim-
its to the "self-policing" effectiveness in radio communications. On Soviet
jamming of the Voice of America, see Taylor, Political Warfare: A Sword
We Must Unsheathe, The Reporter, Sept. 14, 1961, pp. 27, 30.
65. See MicHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 24.
66. Arthur Larson, Director of the World Rule of Law Center at Duke,
in discussing alternative sanctions to force in enforcing international agree-
ments states:
If its Council finds that a member nation has refused to comply with
a final decision of the International Court of Justice or of an arbitral
body, the contracting states undertake not to allow the airlines of the
offending state to operate in their territory. A more crushing sanc-
tion could hardly be imagined.
Larson, Arms Control Through World Law, Daedalus, Fall 1960, pp. 1039,
1050.
67. That "the logic, the imperative, of the new weapons" requires ma-
jor continuing attention to disarmament, see FINLETTER, FOREIGN POL-
ICY: THE NExT PHASE (THE 1960s) 11 (1960).
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powers and purposes in a universal organization equipped with more
than debating functions, lies in the overwhelming threat of contempo-
rary technological and scientific developments to the security and, in-
deed, to the survival of mankind. The destructive capacity of the H-
bomb, which dwarfs the destructive power even of the early A-bombs;
the development of inter-continental missiles which can cross the
oceans in fractions of an hour, travelling at tremendous heights; the
early prospect of manned rockets landing on the moon or, in years to
come, even on planets, coupled with the capacity to set up service sta-
tions in outer space, and the fact that all these overwhelmingly de-
structive devices are now available to the major opposing powers, and
not to one side only, are held by some to be an almost impelling
force towards a far more advanced world order than that represented
by the present World Organization. 68
This would seem the way of rationality but fear has not yet been
sufficiently strong to compel agreement on arms control.69 More
and more people are becoming engaged in the discussion, however,
and others are striving through proposals for intermediate and par-
tial goals which, if achieved, will lead to broader agreements or,
at least, prevent further deterioration of the international situa-
tion. Specifically, many see a failure to agree on a "law of outer
space" as an incipient "cold war" issue of eventual disastrous pro-
portions.70
Friedmann suggests that the destructive power of modern wea-
pons will induce the contending blocs to remain at arms length in
order to maintain a co-existence without annihilating warfare. He
points out, however, that this is a very different thing from the
"gradual integration of principles and institutions, as it is being
attempted by the nations of Western Europe. 71 He hopefully
suggests that the fantastic progress of transport and communica-
tions will eventually impress upon the nations of the world the
anachronism of an extreme form of national sovereignty.72 He
sees value in the United Nations keeping alive international agree-
ments even at the lowest technical denominator of collabora-
tion73 and, as a corollary, that it is most desirable that member-
ship in the United Nations be as detached as possible from ideo-
68. FRmDMANN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 479.
69. Consider, however, as KAHN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 562, points
out, the more awesome the weapons, the greater the provocation that can
be risked by a reckless nation without fear of violent retaliation.
70. See, e.g., Cooper, The Rule of Law in Outer Space, 47 A.B.A.J.
23 (1961); Finney, Space Question: How High is Up?-Altitude of Na-
tional Sovereignty is a Difficult Legal Puzzle, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1961,
p. E7, col. 1.
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logical rivalry since the obligations of membership may contribute
in some small way to international agreements on such matters as
a nuclear testing ban.74
One of the more rational tendencies recently explored is that of
sharing costly physical science research work. It is becoming ever
more apparent that the modem research and development function
involves hazardous choices in the allocation of funds for specific
projects having a high degree of unpredictability of "success. '175
On the other hand, scientifically advanced nations can be expected
to reach similar scientific and technological goals independently. It
therefore becomes quite pertinent to ask whether the "first dis-
covery" gains of proceeding on a national basis now justify the
vast wastage in duplicated efforts of the best trained scientific
minds of the several nations or the tremendous costs of develop-
ing such devices as nuclear space propulsion systems.
Concern has also been manifested over adverse competitive as-
pects of national programs in space technology. Efforts have been
made toward a joint U.S.-French space effort as one of the pro-
posed projects in the United States' program of international co-
operation in space."6 This program has been slow in materi-
alizing for the reason that technical and political restric-
tions still severely hamper such joint ventures. But several nations
of Western Europe, realizing that their individual national re-
sources are not sufficient for extensive research and development
in space technology, have acknowledged the threat of "technical
backwardness" if they do not make serious efforts toward joint
ventures in this field, in particular with respect to such projects
as satellites to be used for communications, astronomy, naviga-
tion and meteorology.7"
Another dimension of the disposition toward agreement which,
in the long run, may be of considerable importance is that of a
"compulsive dynamic" of cooperation as reflected in expanding
74. Id. at 480-81.
75. See Barnett, Research and Development, Economic Growth, and
National Security, 327 ANNALS 36, 43-44 (1960).
76. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1961, p. 1, col. 2, with reference to multi-
nation projects.
77. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1961, p. 2, col. 2, discussing the "Stras-
bourg Meeting" at which the proposed 12-nation joint space plan was
aimed at ending "the space monopoly now held by the United States and
the Soviet Union." Plans of this group to launch a "European satellite"
in mid-1965 have been described as "probably the biggest technological
effort any group of countries has attempted in history." N.Y. Times, Nov.
5, 1961, p. 2, col. 4. This program is expected to assure an important role




common social patterns resulting from scientific advance, tech-
nological application, and industrial processes. The authors of
Industrialism and Industrial Man speak of the "inherent logic of
industrialism '7 1 interacting with the diversity of cultural factors,
economic constraints, and the strategies of political elites, and add:
By the middle of the twenty-first century, industrialization will have
swept away most pre-industrial forms of society, except possibly a few
odd backwaters.
This is the great transformation . . -more basic, more rapid,
and more universal than any earlier transformation. . . . It is the
great transformation-successful, all-embracing, irreversible. 79
To what degree will this vast, uneven, but seemingly irreversible
movement produce a societal order which, despite abberations,
tends toward cooperative civilized existence?" Our atomic wea-
pons monopoly of 1946 clearly did not bring order into a politi-
cally tense world."' The spread of nuclear weapons technology
since has seemingly demonstrated that improved techniques are
merely tools of the political power process and have little short
range influence over progressive social development. But in long
range terms, does technology have a special dynamic of its own
which promotes, and to some degree compels, common attitudes
and practices which promise to turn technology from the power
arena with its premium on force to the forum of persuasion with
consequent extension of education, vocational and professional
skills, demands for wider participation in political processes, and
eventually, rational recognition of the desirability of employing
technological skills for the improvement of the conditions of ex-
istence?
The "logic of industrialism" 2 does seem to bring a greater
recognition of interdependence among nations.8 3 This trend ap-
pears well defined although pre-industrial nations do manifest
78. INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 265.
79. Id. at 266.
80. See Toynbee, Education: The Long View, Saturday Rev., Nov. 19,
1960, p. 60, wherein it is suggested that judicious use of the available
technology can provide a basis for a more cooperative world. But see
RoSTOW, op. cit. supra note 24. Rostow indicates that one choice many
nations in the "post-maturity" stage of industrialization make is to attempt
to pursue external power and influence through their industrial and tech-
nological potential. Id. at 73.
81. See Jones, supra note 54, wherein the writer discusses 1946 as the
critical point at which technology pointed either to a world of comfort
and harmony or to the possible destruction of civilization. He notes that
instead of cooperation, the nations went the way of most past experience
and split into hostile camps.
82. See INDUSTRIALSM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 33-46.
83. Id. at 45-46. See also Kissinger, For an Atlantic Confederacy,
The Reporter, Feb. 2, 1961, p. 16.
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strong nationalistic tendencies at an early stage of their industrial
awakening.8" It is precarious, however, to generalize very far on
the possibilities of spreading industrialism as a cohesive, inte-
grating force toward cooperative world order. Even at the stage of
technological maturity, there are many choices available which
may shape the behavior patterns of a given society.85 It is also to
be noted that greater interdependence among nations does not
necessarily mean more harmonious relations.86
Even accepting the proposition that industrialism will be a cen-
tral dynamic in the coming decades, that most nations will "pro-
gress" toward a stage of industrial maturity, and that the gap be-
tween the highly industrialized and the pre-industrial societies will
diminish rather than increase,87 will the sharing of industrial re-
sources, processes and techniques promote more favorable atti-
tudes toward international or regional cooperative activities in mat-
ters of major importance to such peoples? It might be reasoned
that such will not be the case since common patterns will exist
only with respect to technological activities, technical innovations
being more or less independent of socio-political attitudes and in-
stitutions. Yet, is not the "more or less" qualification the point
upon which attention should be focused? Do not technical changes
which tend to be standardized from nation to nation, especially
when incorporated into the broader, more pervasive "logic of in-
dustrialism," produce more uniform social and political patterns? 8
84. See the discussion of "interdetermination" and "parochializing fac-
tors" in LASSwELL, op. cit. supra note 62, at 29-31, 35.
85. See RosTow, op. cit. supra note 24, at 12-16.
86. That closer interdependence through more efficient international
communications may produce hostility instead of friendship under con-
ditions of social inequality, see Toynbee, supra note 80, at 79.
87. "The extreme discrepencies in methods of production which now
exist between more advanced and less industrialized countries will tend to
be eliminated in the pure industrial society, although significant differences
in income levels and in the specialization of activity are likely to remain."
INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 46.
See also FROMM, op. cit. supra note 62, at 11. To the same effect, see
Davis, A New Look at a Global Puzzle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1962,§ 6 (Magazine), p. 24; Dedijer, Book Review, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Feb. 1962, p. 35 (Review of GRUBER, SCIENCE AND TE NEW NATIONS(1961). Haskins says that up to the point where the economic base of
the new nations is substantially broadened, the advanced technologies of
the already industrialized nations "may actually widen rather than narrow
existing economic gaps. Failure on either side to remember this can easily
lead to dangerous errors and bitter disillusionment." Haskins, supra note
36, at 235.
88. See RosTow, op. cit. supra note 24, at 12-13. See also INDUSTIAL-
ISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 296. Professor Daniel Lerner of the Center
of International Studies at M.I.T. has predicted the political formation
of a United States of Europe within the next generation: "Europe has com-
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Perhaps this is only a long range hope. Even if it should so de-
velop, there would, of course, be certain adverse qualities associat-
ed with such standardization, 9 but this would, presumably, be
preferable to the annihilation with which we are now confronted.90
Common cultural traditions are no guarantee against violence,
of course. But in view of the overwhelming destructive power of
the new military technology, are such nations prone to violence
today with respect to one another? Possibly not, at least there
would seem to be among the nations of the West no stubborn in-
sistence that only one specific economic or political system can be
permitted to survive within their regional community.9 Further-
more, interdependence is being factually strengthened by such ar-
rangements as the increasing number of regional economic agree-
ments.
92
Before we can hope to have reliable answers to the above ques-
tions, assuming that sufficient evidence exists to provide more
than an equivocal answer, a comprehensive analysis would be
required, reducing the inquiry to specific contexts wherein condi-
tions, trends, and practices are systematically described, the flow
of decisions analyzed, and the effects of such practices and deci-
sions evaluated.93
One of the more promising functional indices for measuring the
prospects for greater regional and international cooperation is the
collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of scientific and
technological data, whether arising from research projects or from
other scientific undertakings. The research and development func-
tion is, of course, an integral part of the movement toward a more
highly industrialized society.94 While there are numerous requi-
mitted itself so deeply to collective responsibility that it no longer will be
possible to go back to a Europe of separate nations." He further states that
progress in economic unification is showing the way to political unification.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1961, p. 4, col. 7.
89. See HUTCHINS, Two FACES OF FEDERALISM 23-24 (1961). To the
degree that greater industrialization leads to more cooperative practices,
see Clark, We Must Exercise the Genes of Patience, Saturday Rev., Oct.
7, 1961, p. 54.
90. See Chase, Book Review, Saturday Rev., Nov. 4, 1961, p. 22 (Review
of FROMM, MAY MAN PREVAIL? (1961)).
91. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47; RosTow, op. cit. supra note
24. Rostow projects a "diffusion of power" throughout the entire world as
industrialization progresses according to his "stages of growth." Specifically,
he attributes this tendency to "the paradoxical character of the new wea-
pons and the diffusion of effective power they have brought about, in the
setting of nuclear stalemate." Id. at 126.
92. See Chase, supra note 50.
93. See McDougal, supra note 62, at 37-38.
94. See Barnett, supra note 75, at 37; INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note
4, at 289. See also comments on the Report of the President's Science
1962]
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sites and incidents of technological development such as investment
capital and skilled personnel, clearly the research function and the
constant accumulation of knowledge are fundamental to this ad-
vance.9" The question is whether research, and the potential
dissemination of scientific, technological, and industrial knowl-
edge in those areas wherein the sharing in or the agreeing upon
the use and control of such technical data is important, offer
an effective means of achieving workable regional or interna-
tional arrangements on matters of wide socio-political significance.
While we may look forward eventually to "law" in the international
sphere as formal authority supported by effective control,96 this
goal, in any comprehensive sense, seems remote. Hence the more
modest objectives of wider agreement or even loose consensus,
whatever leads to greater cooperative attitudes and action, must be
looked to with favor. In what ways, if any, can the research and
information dissemination function play a positive role in promot-
ing this somewhat limited objective?
A wide range of inducements spur scientific research. Gaining a
competitive superiority, whether it be at the industrial-commercial
level or in the international military power arena, is a constant
incentive. In the present era, when a technological "break-through"
can quickly render a weapons system obsolete or greatly reduce
its effectiveness, 97 the feverish pace of the research function needs
little explanation. Severe stresses are placed on national policy-
makers since a mistaken decision in the choice of alternative re-
search projects,9" or the extent to which basic scientific research
Advisory Committee, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 81, col. 5: "Research
is not only big business in itself, [but] a growing big business . ..."
The nation spent $3 billion for research and development in 1950. In 1960
it spent $13 billion. Ibid.
95. See Barnett, supra note 75, at 42-43.
96. See McDOUGAL, STUDmIES IN WORLD PUBLIc ORDER 1023 (1960).
97. See Arms Control: Last Chance?, Newsweek, March 20, 1961, p.
35. See also Siegel, supra note 24, at 247, "with respect to technical sur-
prise"-the unpredictability of a specific invention or discovery as of a giv-
en time.
98. The call for careful review of priorities in research undertakings
has been sounded from several quarters. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1960, § 4, p. 8, col. 1. (Editorial-Dr. Killian on Priorities); Finney,
Changes Weighed in Science Policy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1961, § 1, p.
36, col. 1. See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1961, § 1, p. 62, col. 4, with respect to
Administration cutbacks in the weather satellite program and nuclear
rocket program, Project Rover. The Administration's reluctance to push
Project Rover into the hardware stage is causing concern in congressional
quarters that the project may be taken down the same dead-end path as
the nuclear airplane. After many studies, the Administration has terminated
that project. $600 million was spent on the abandoned atomic airplane.
See N.Y. Times, March 12, 1961, § 1, p. 1, col. 7. A new and important
decision faced the Administration in June 1961 with respect to the develop-
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is to be emphasized at the expense of immediate technological
application of existing scientific knowledge, may carry grave risks
in terms of national power position.99 Clearly major scientific and
technological accomplishments add to the power and prestige of
nations.10  But today, the amazing success of such advances may
ment of the "neutron bomb." See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1961, § 1, p. 1,
col. 1. Continued questioning of the value of the proposed "moon trip" in
comparison with other alternative public interest programs such as educa-
tion has recently received the attention of Edward C. Welsh, executive
secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. See Wash. Post,
Feb. 23, 1962, p. A2, col. 4.
99. See generally Barnett, supra note 75, at 36. It is noted, for example,
that despite the colossal uncertainty and ignorance of the outcome of
military research and development and its tremendous cost, we have no
alternative but to continue. Id. at 43. Barnett also finds that all duplication
of effort is not wasted but that the high degree of unpredictability of
success requires that multiple paths be tried. "There is a great deal of di-
rect evidence that centralization and strong, detailed, and early program-
ming of military research and development tend to be less productive of
major advances and more costly than more competitive, uncontrolled, and
exploratory approaches." Id. at 44. The Soviets have, apparently, been
placing stress on applied rather than theoretical mathematical research,
the latter being a field in which they have long excelled. In evaluating the
long-term effects of American as opposed to Soviet approach to mathe-
matics, the opinion has been expressed that "one of the fundamental
strengths of American mathematics . .. is the diversity of freedom of
research permitted scientists in this country." Finney, Mathematics Lag
Seen For Soviet, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1961, p. 7, col. 5. The Soviets
have placed considerable stress on computer research and programming
which has caused some concern in this country although it is still the view
of our mathematicians that "there was a much greater chance of new ideas
under the American approach." Ibid. See Randall, Buried with Mr. K's
Statistics, Atlantic, Jan. 1961, p. 64.
100. Philip B. Yeager, Special Consultant to the Committee on Science
and Astronautics of the House of Representatives, states that the more im-
portant values of space exploration can be designated as: military value,
prestige value, knowledge value and eventual commercial value. Yeager,
The Politico-Legal Needs of Space Exploration, 47 A.B.A.J. 275 (1961).
See N.Y. Times, April 13, 1961, p. 15, col. 8, for a discussion of the man-
ner in which the U.S.S.R. has attempted to exploit for political purposes
its technological space feats by labelling such successes as Major Ga-
garin's man-in-orbit flight as a demonstration of "victorious socialism." See
also Finney & Schwartz, The Race in Space: The Scientific and the
Propaganda Aspects, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1961, § 4, p. 3, cols. 1, 3, dis-
cussing the U.S.S.R.'s use of technological successes to claim Communism
as the "conquering wave of the future." See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1961, § 4, p. 3, col. 6, which discusses how Major Titov's 25-hour space
flight was exploited by the U.S.S.R. as symbolizing Communist superiority
and ultimate victory. The manner in which the U.S.S.R. utilizes spectacular
technology to implement a "many-sided psychological offensive" is dis-
cussed in Haskins, supra note 36, at 225.
The Kennedy Administration made a quick shift in attitude toward
space projects after the Soviet "man-in-space" success. A top level review
was initiated to determine an area in which the United States might take
the lead. The President said: " 'We have to consider whether there is any
program now, regardless of its cost, which offers us hope of being pioneers
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constitute a strong influence in encouraging resort to non-violent
means of settling differences in view of the fearful alternative
posed.
The essential question remains, however: what impact might
the rapidly accumulating knowledge in science, technology, and
related fields have on the disposition toward voluntary interna-
tional cooperative activity? For example, does the spread of medi-
cal science and uniformity of practice have any impact whatso-
ever on the disposition of peoples of different cultural backgrounds
to reach cooperative arrangements with respect to other matters
wherein some measure of interdependence exists, and which, if
developed, might be of mutual advantage to all on any civilized
scale of values? Or what is the effect, if any, on attitudes toward
international cooperation of the widening distribution and use of
radioactive isotopes in medicine and agriculture or of nuclear
power technology?' But instances of the possible effects of iso-
lated techniques are not, perhaps, a fair means of judging the im-
pact of the total complex of technological interchange and ab-
sorption into people's thinking. There would seem to be numerous
strands in the growing pattern of interdependence which are tech-
nologically based.0 2
One of the more notable feats in recent transnational coopera-
in a project.' " N.Y. Times, April 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. In May 1961
the Kennedy Administration decided that the "nation should now commit
itself to 'a great new American enterprise' of attempting to land a man on
the moon before the end of the [present] decade." N.Y. Times, May 26,
1961, p. 13, col. 6. Previously it had been felt that the estimated $40
billion cost of the moon project might best be employed in other areas of
national goals, but the impressive gain in prestige which might result if
the U.S. should beat the U.S.S.R. to the moon was apparently a decisive
consideration. Ibid. But see Loory, Why This Space Race?, The Reporter,
April 27, 1961, p. 19. Loory discusses the dubious value of the man-in-
space program citing James R. Killian, chairman of the board of M.I.T.
and scientific adviser to former President Eisenhower:
Since World War II, the status-seekers in the community of nations
have relied increasingly on science and technology as an instrument of
propaganda and power politics, as illustrated by their great and suc-
cessful effort-and careful political timing-in space exploration.
They have sought constantly to present spectacular accomplishments
in space technology as an index of national strength, and too often
the press and public at large have interpreted these spectacular ex-
ploits as indices of strength.
Id. at 20. But a favorable attitude toward the "moon project" was ex-
pressed by Harold C. Urey, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1961, § 4, p. 8, col. 7
(Letter to the Editor), for reasons of scientific investigation and fulfillment
of human aspirations in the sense of new adventure and achievement.
101. There appears to be an increasing pattern of standardization of
practices in the international atomic energy area. See AToMIc ENERGY
COMM'N ANN. REP. 203 (1960).
102. See IND-USTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 266-67.
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tion, the International Geophysical Year, has been described as
"a peaceful, cooperative program of unprecedented scientific scope
. . "103 Though limited in its political objectives and implica-
tions, this venture, which included scientists of 66 nations, made
impressive strides in the collection and sharing of useful geo-
physical data. It showed the possibility, at least, of wide coopera-
tion on those scientific matters of obvious mutual advantage. The
Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was in part an outgrowth of the IGY co-
operation in Antarctica by 12 interested nations,' including the
U.S.S.R., which in general compiled a fair record of data sharing
during IGY with the exception of information relevant to space
exploration, rockets, satellites, and nuclear explosions. °5 The
Treaty itself, which has as one of its major objectives the keeping
of Antarctica as an "uncluttered scientific laboratory," provides for
demilitarization of the Antarctic, full and complete unilateral rights
of inspection, the promotion of scientific investigation and coop-
eration, the banning of nuclear explosions, and a prohibition
against the dumping of radioactive wastes.'
Some observers have expressed the hope that successful coop-
eration in the Antarctic might provide a precedent for agreements
in other more contentious areas as, for example, outer space, where-
in similar conditions exist to a degree. 0 7 Antarctica, however,
is not as strategically important as outer space. Nor is it, at this
time, economically significant. 0 With respect to outer space,
however, the Antarctic Treaty does emphasize the need to secure
agreement prior to the time vested interests are solidified. It is
easier "to preserve a present peaceful status quo rather than force
a retreat from a point of tension."'0 9 A disarmament or nuclear
test ban agreement is, therefore, quite a different matter since na-
tional boundaries are set and the requisite inspection provisions
of such an agreement would probably b3 viewed with disfavor."0
103. Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarctica, INTERNATIONAL CONCILI-
ATIONS, Jan. 1961, p. 265. See also SULLIVAN, ASSAULT ON THE UN-
KNOWN: THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR (1961).
104. See Taubenfeld, supra note 103, at 266, 280.
105. Id. at 266. See also Leonard, N.Y. Times, April 23, 1961 (Book
Review), p. 1 (Review of SULLIVAN, ASSAULT ON THE UNKNoWN: THE
INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR (1961)).
106. Taubenfeld, supra note 103, at 282.
107. Id. at 274, 307. In connection with extending the principles of
the Antarctica Treaty to outer space see Of Arms, Antarctica and Space,
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1961, p. 30, col. 1.
108. Taubenfeld, supra note 103, at 307.
109. Id. at 302.
110. The nuclear test ban negotiations of spring and summer 1961
found the U.S.S.R. reluctant to agree to the U.S. proposal involving a
greater number of inspections by international teams than the U.S.S.R.
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Nevertheless, however limited the Antarctic Treaty may be as a
precedent, it has led to a cooperative arrangement and is a small
step toward mutual trust. It has been described as a "confidence
builder."'M
The encouraging, if modest, gain in international cooperation
resulting from IGY and the Antarctic Treaty is to be compared
with the less obvious success of the International Atomic Energy
Agency." 2 This activity, established for the purpose of providing
"a supply service of nuclear fuel materials and to provide help in
setting up 'projects',""' seems to some observers to have been
rendered largely impotent by the practices of the "Nuclear Greats"
who have catered to friendly nations through bilateral aid pro-
grams instead of channeling all of their assistance through the
Agency."' Furthermore, several private industrial concerns in the
field of nuclear reactor technology have taken an active part in
was willing to consider, ostensibly because the West would use such in-
spections for espionage purposes. See N.Y. Times, May 31, 1961, p. 7,
col. 3.
111. See Taubenfeld, supra note 103, at 311.
112. See Joshi, Dead or Alive? International Atomic Energy Agency,
17 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 95 (1961). But see 17 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 86, 89 (1961), to the effect that the IAEA, though not spec-
tacular, has given encouraging signs of progress in international coop-
eration in assistance to underdeveloped nations at the governmental level.
For a somewhat similar appraisal, see Randers, What About Vienna?, 17
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 20 (1961). 'The International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA) was conceived as an instrument for enabling East
and West to work together on technical and economic problems, apart
from the arena of political conflict. The United States . . . saw the
Agency principally as a means of siphoning off atomic materials from
military to peaceful uses and of establishing a system of international
safeguards: the national arms limitation objectives." REPORT TO T
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., RE-
VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES 57 (Comm. Print 1960) [Hereinafter referred to as the
"Second McKinney Report"]. The U.S.S.R. representative to the IAEA
objected so strenuously to alleged U.S. rule of the Agency and to the
installation of Dr. Eklund as director general that he threatened to rec-
ommend the Soviet Union withdraw from further participation. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 1961, p. 4, col. 3.
113. "Second McKinney Report," supra note 112, at 78E.
114. See Joshi, supra note 112, at 96. As of September 1961, the
United States had agreements for cooperation with 38 countries, West
Berlin, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic
Energy Community. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1961, p. 17, col. 2; Gins-
burgs, The Soviet Union and International Co-operation in the Peaceful Use
of Atomic Energy: Bilateral Agreements, 54 AM. 1. INT'L L. 605, 614
(1960), finds that "despite some inevitable variations in emphasis and enun-
ciation, the formal contents [though neither the underlying motivations nor
the actual implementation] of the U.S.S.R. and the United States agree-
ments in the sphere of so-called 'Atoms for Peace' are remarkably simi-
lar."
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this international traffic." 5 Assuming, however, that the atomic
energy industry has reached sufficient maturity to handle the in-
structional and safety aspects of this operation, such private initi-
ative may be viewed as a useful alternative means of promoting
standardized international practices in the atomic power field. The
present ambiguous status of the Agency has prompted proposals
for revision of its objectives. These proposals range from shifting
its function to that of a general International Technological As-
sistance Agency to that of providing a forum for the study of the
technical aspects of disarmament." 6
Most assuredly there is no consensus today that the complete
sharing of all technological data per se leads to better prospects
for international or regional cooperation."' Considerable discrim-
ination should be used in defining precisely the informational con-
text involved. It is necessary to ask: Who says What to Whom
through what Channel with what Purpose and with what Effect?
It is possible that many significant insights would be gained into
the dynamics of international agreement through careful analysis
of the information function since it seems that it may have an ex-
tremely close correlation to the degree to which the total techno-
logical process influences attitudes toward cooperation. For pres-
ent purposes, a few sample viewpoints on the matter may as-
sist in illuminating the interaction between the dissemination of
115. Id. at 95-96. American Machine & Foundry Co. has been the
world leader in the building of research atomic reactors and constructs
such devices for international purchasers. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1961,
§ 3, p. 1, col. 5.
116. See Joshi, supra note 112, at 95-97.
117. For expression of a variety of viewpoints touching on this matter,
see Rourke, How Much Should the Government Tell? Saturday Rev.,
May 13, 1961, p. 17; Ransom, Secret Mission in an Open Society, N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1961, § 6 (Magazine), p. 20; Public Secrets and Presi-
dential Responsibility, The Reporter, May 11, 1961. On the government's
news policy, see statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara in N.Y.
Times, May 12, 1961, p. 10, col. 2; Krock, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1961,§ 4, p. 11, col. 1, discussing President Kennedy's request of the press for
voluntary restraint in the disclosure of national security information; and
Anderson, The Test Debate: 'We Need to Know More,' N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, § 6 (Magazine), p. 15. Acknowledgement that the "Capitalistic West"
is making great strides on many scientific and technological fronts has
been made by Soviet spokesmen who call for a wider sharing of informa-
tion among the scientists of the Soviet Bloc and also with the capitalist
world in areas of peaceful uses of atomic energy-as for example, in the
harnessing of thermonuclear reactions. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1961,
p. 13, col. 1. See Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, Janu-
ary-December 1960, AEC, January 1961, p. 215: Bilateral Cooperative
Activities-Cooperation with the U.S.S.R., which summarizes the exchange
visits under the U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy of November 24, 1959.
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technological data and the disposition toward cooperative prac-
tices.
Several prominent American scientists have expressed the view
that our alleged excessive security precautions in the realm of
classified scientific data are self-defeating."" Edward Teller has
asserted that our safety does not rest in keeping all our discoveries
to ourselves but in the speedy production of new ideas; that the
interchange of ideas is vital; that for the swiftest scientific and
technological advance we should pool our efforts and information
with other nations of the free world; that our refusal to share nu-
clear weapons technology with our allies has resulted in unnec-
essary and wasteful duplication of effort; that our inability to dis-
cuss fully various weapons systems with other Western nations
is a serious weakness in our defense system."19 He further
points out that general scientific principles can be kept secret for
only a short time although technical and engineering details can
be safeguarded with somewhat greater success and that certain
types of military operational information such as the strategic dis-
positions of nuclear weapon launchers should not, of course, be
divulged.' Teller then says:
The advantages of openness and the dangers of secrecy become par-
ticularly obvious if we try to look into developments of the future.
The safety and prosperity of an interrelated world depend upon in-
ternational cooperation. This cooperation must, in the end, embrace
all nations, but it is urgent that it be established soon between the free
and friendly countries.
Secrecy is contagious. It erects barriers between friends. It causes
suspicion between strangers. And it obscures needed public discussion
on the national and world-wide scene. Openness will certainly help the
free world to obtain the initiative in the great task of world organiza-
tion.121
118. See, e.g., Rabi, The Cost of Secrecy, The Atlantic, Aug. 1960, p.39; LAPP, THE VOYAGE OF THE LUCKY DRAGON, reviewed in 14 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTs 236 (1958).
119., See Teller, Perilous Illusion: Secrecy Means Security, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1960, § 6 (Magazine), p. 29.
120. Ibid.
121. Id. at 128. Teller cites the liberalization of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1958 which provided for greater freedom of exchange with our
allies as a large step forward, although even under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 the United States was enabled to enter into bilateral agreements
for cooperation with friendly nations for the dissemination of atomic
energy information in the peaceful uses of this new resource. See Mallison,
The United States Bilateral Agreements For Co-operation in the Civil
Uses of Atomic Energy, AMERICAN SOC'Y INT'L L. 142 (1957). For ob-
servations to the effect that the U.S. policies regarding technological se-
crecy are self-defeating and that Soviet practices in this area have been
more selective and realistic, see STRAUsz-HuPE, KINTNER & POSSONY, Op.
cit. supra note 7, at 68, 69. For a series of views generally advocating "se-
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Unquestionably we face a dilemma: "If we abandon secrecy,
we give the Communists an advantage; if we retain secrecy, we
slow down our progress, separate ourselves from our allies, and
impede the formation of a well-founded public opinion."'22 The
latter point, domestic secrecy, is a matter over which there has
been considerable controversy for the past several years. 2 ' The
extent to which greater interchange of research data within the
American scientific community would enhance our national power
position, or the degree to which greater divulgence of scientific
and technological information to the American people would pro-
mote conditions favorable to international or regional agreements
relating to such matters as nuclear data sharing is extremely hard,
if not impossible to judge.'24 Clearly, the occasional "leak" of
classified information transmitted to our allies has not served to
encourage less restrictive policies by the Congress."
The "Second McKinney Report"'2 6 on atomic energy develop-
ment makes a strong plea for a cooperative atomic energy research
effort between the United States and our Western European allies
so as to make maximum use of the combined capacities of skilled
personnel and laboratory facilities.'17 Though attempts to limit
the flow of information on scientific progress from Western re-
search can "no longer have any real dampening effect on Soviet
progress,"'" the Report suggests that arrangements for con-
sultations with the Soviets on technical matters assure that the flow
is in both directions and that the West has access to areas of
Soviet scientific and technical strength as a condition of such col-
curity by achievement" instead of "security by concealment," see Hughes,
Positive Aspects of the Release of Secret Information, 12 BULL. ATOMIc
SCIENTISTS 169 (1956).
122. Teller, supra note 119, at 128.
123. See Moss, The Crisis of Secrecy, 17 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
8 (1961).
124. Id. at 9.
125. In December 1957, without advance consultation with or approval
from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Administration of-
fered to help members of NATO develop and build nuclear submarines.
In 1958 the committee "reluctantly" went along with a change in the
secrecy provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to permit such cooperation
and greater exchange of information about atomic weapons. After the ar-
rest of five persons in Britain accused of passing nuclear submarine secrets
to the Soviet Union, one committee member was quoted as saying: "If Brit-
ain can't protect such secrets, what is going to happen in some of the other
countries where there is a strong Communist party or the possibility of an
overthrow of the government?" See Finney, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1961, p.
1, col. 5.
126. "Second McKinney Report," supra note 112.
127. Id. at 78A-78E.
128. Id. at 66.
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laboration.'29 These recommendations are seemingly based on the
need for making the most rapid progress possible at the level of
scientific and technological knowledge, primarily for long range
security purposes rather than in the interest of cost reduction. 30
The Report further suggests that such exchanges of information
can be achieved more rapidly and effectively if actions taken in
this direction are limited to matters which are scientific and tech-
nical in nature and are kept free "of excessive buffering at dip-
lomatic and administrative levels.''
Scientific and technical information is today one of the most
critically important resources in the international power process,
particularly where the capital and industrial base are available to
take advantage of such knowledge. Of growing concern in this
connection is the so-called "Nth Country" problem, the prospects
of an increasing number of nations gaining the technology and
facilities to embark on a successful nuclear weapons program,
with presumably, the increasing probability of nuclear war.
Apparently, ten or more nations are close to having this capability
-should they desire it.'32 Hanson Baldwin suggests that our pol-
icy of delaying nuclear weapons diffusion-while we explore ways
of controlling the "monster we have created"-may be disastrous
if practiced by the United States and the West alone since Russia
is giving "some" weapons technology assistance to Red China,
however reluctantly.'33 He continues: "Our policy toward France,
which conceals from our ally knowledge that the Communists
already have, would seem to be mistaken. And our NATO alli-
ance, which badly needs modernization of its weapons, could de-
generate politically as well as militarily, unless it keeps pace
with the Communist powers."' 34
A phase of current United States policy is illustrated by the re-
cent Atomic Energy Commission Report on the Status of Gas
129. Ibid.
130. Id. at 781.
131. Id. at 781.
132. See Baldwin, If Sixteen Countries Had the Bomb, N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 1961, § 6 (Magazine), p. 7. See also Kraft, supra note 19, at 35-36,
for a discussion of means of deterring the drive toward national nuclear
capabilities so as to seek the abandonment of this "wasteful pursuit."
133. Baldwin, supra note 132, at 69.
134. Ibid. The refusal or passive resistance of the United States to share
with France nuclear and missile knowledge "not hedged in by legal restric-
tions" has become a point of extreme friction between these two Western
nations. As Robert C. Doty reported in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1962, p.
1, col. 5: "Relations between France and the United States (will] remain
unsettled as long as Washington opposes France's ambitions to become
an independent nuclear power and a major European military force."
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Centrifuge Technology.' 5 In an accompanying statement, form-
er Chairman John A. McCone, after discounting the immediate
practicality of this means of separating Uranium 235 from Urani-
um 238 in order to produce weapons grade material, went on to
say:
We do not minimize the potential importance of this process, however,
although the gas centrifuge does not pose an immediate prospect for
production of weapons material, there is no doubt in my mind it will
introduce an additional complicating factor in the problems of nu-
clear arms among nations and our quest for controlled disarmament.
If successfully developed, a production plant using the gas centrifuge
methods could be simply housed. Its power requirements would be
relatively small, and there would be no effects of the operation which
would easily disclose the plant. Therefore, a clandestine plant would
not be as easy to detect as a gaseous diffusion plant.'3 6
As the Report makes clear, the new gas centrifuge technology was
developed by the scientists of West Germany and the Netherlands,
therefore:
In July of 1960 representatives of the Department of State and of the
Atomic Energy Commission discussed centrifuge technology with the
West German and Netherlands Governments and the United States
asked that Germany and the Netherlands give consideration to the
control of gas centrifuge technology. The two countries shared the
concern of the United States over the possible application of the cen-
trifuge process for weapons production. 137
But some observers have felt the necessity of questioning the wis-
dom of a continuation of this approach to the "Nth Country"
135. United States Atomic Energy Commission Release of December
13, 1960.
136. Statement by John A. McCone, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission on Status and Prospects of Gas Centrifuge Technology.
137. The ABC Report continues: "The West German Government re-
cently announced that it has taken steps to control the dissemination of
information on the gas centrifuge process. The United States understands
that the Netherlands Government is actively studying the question of ap-
plying controls to its work." See supra note 135, at 4. The report then dis-
cusses other methods for producing fissionable materials: gaseous diffusion
plants and breeder reactors which produce plutonium. But the cost and dif-
ficulties of these processes is emphasized. The U.S. found itself in the di-
lemma of having to move in two wholly contradictory policy directions
in June, 1961. Hoping first for a successful negotiation on the nuclear
test ban and the gradual reduction in nuclear weapons emphasis and pro-
duction, the obdurance of the U.S.S.R. to show interest in the test ban
compelled the U.S. to consider supplying the French with missiles and guid-
ance systems for nuclear weapons in order to solidify the West against
the Soviet threat-but thereby aggravating the Nth country problem which
the U.S. has attempted to retain within limited and manageable bounds.
See Sulzberger, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1961, p. 23, col. 4.
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problem, seemingly on the basis that nuclear weapons tech-
nology will inevitably spread as has been the case with other ad-
vanced technologies.' 38
It is, of course, a mistake to oversimplify the problem of sharing
scientific and technological data, not to mention the much more
sensitive informational problem of inspections which would be re-
quired in connection with arms control agreements. The disclosure
of costly and possibly competitive military or industrial data by
the technically advanced nations does not necessarily promote mu-
tual trust. The effect may be contempt, or at least suspicion. This
points up a matter previously mentioned,'39 namely, the import-
ance of our images, or in more precise language, the constructs or
models we employ of other peoples and nations upon which we
base our predictions as to what their reactions will be under a
given set of conditions.
It is, therefore, important that careful analysis be given to the
ability and disposition of a given nation or regional group to ab-
sorb new scientific knowledge and techniques. Much may de-
pend, for example, in specific cases on the character of the ruling
elite and how this position of authority was achieved. Assuming
that the factors affecting industrial development provide a rough
gauge for measuring probable technological assimilation capacity,
then such elements as the nature of the pre-existing society, the
role of geography, the stage of history, and the accidents of history
are of basic importance. 140 Since each society differs with respect
to these factors, each can be expected to follow its own dis-
tinctive course of technological development and at any given stage
of growth will be in position to utilize only certain types of sci-
entific knowledge and industrial techniques.' 4'
We really know very little about how new ideas disseminate
through societies, 42 including information of a scientific and tech-
nological nature, or of the probable response thereto, in terms of
138. That within three years approximately 26 nations will have the
capability to make nuclear arms, see Sulzberger, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1961,
p. 20, col. 4. See Ide, Nth Countries and Disarmament, 16 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 391, 394 (1960). Consider also Berkner, Needed:
A 'Breakthrough' on Arms Control, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1961, § 6(Magazine), p. 28, wherein the author states that technological deterrents
are perpetually susceptible to rapid obsolescence as a result of further
technological break-throughs and points out that the effectiveness of the
current "mutual deterrence" as between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will diminish
as the Nth country capability enlarges.
139. See Part I supra.
140. See INDusT msM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 286.
141. Id. at 46.
142. MICHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 30.
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opinion formation or of application to technological endeavors.
Donald N. Michael in Proposed Studies on the Implications of
Peaceful Space Activities for Human Affairs states:
A variety of more specific studies on public opinion and values as af-
fected by space activities will depend on research providing trend data
describing . . . the state of knowledge, values, and attitudes regarding
space activities, both on-going and contemplated; and what assump-
tions, expectations, and values underlie the attitudes and interpreta-
tions of this knowledge. What are the effects over time of new
knowledge and events on attitudes toward space activities, and what
are the effects of the sources of information on the acceptability of
the information. 14
3
In a more general vein he continues:
While space activities offer a special opportunity to study the rela-
tionship of innovation to social change, understanding the relationship
will require examination of other innovation situations, too. Research
is recommended to determine . . . what factors historically have en-
tered into support or rejection of new ideas or technologies. What
was and wasn't appreciated about the potentialities (or lack of them)
in the innovation and under what personal and social circumstances
did this occur? In particular, what were the roles of physical environ-
ment, politics, personalities, limited systems analysis capabilities, in-
sufficient communications to decisionmakers, etc.? 44
Considering the number of extremely able scholars, not to men-
tion special task forces, that have given years of study to drms
control and other technologically complicated means of securing
a peaceful and productive international environment, 45 one can
propose only with doubt and reserve. The modest suggestion is
made, however, that a truly thorough examination of the informa-
tion function-the flow of scientific-technological data to the vari-
ous participants in the international political-military arena, their
practices in the utilization of such information, and the probable
effects of withholding or disclosure-would give us valuable in-
sights for the task of making rational calculations of the gains and
losses to be incurred from various policy alternatives and of acting
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 32.
145. That interest in disarmament in the United States has intensified in
recent years and that research on the problem is being conducted by
scholars from diverse fields, see Spingarm (Director of the National Plan-
ning Association's arms control research project), N.Y. Times, May 21,
1961, § 7 (Book Review), p. 10, col. 2. See the various authors
featured by the collection of papers in HAHN & NEFF, AMERICAN STRAT-
EGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE (1960); see also Disarmament and Arms
Control, 17 BULL. AToMIc SCIENTISTS 122 (1961); and see Daedalus,
Fall, 1960 (special issue on Arms Control).
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accordingly from the standpoint of preserving non-violent existence.
The understanding gained from such an inquiry should lead to the
invention of new alternative procedures for channelling the scien-
tific-technological information flow in such manner as to exercise
a moderating effect on present international tensions and enhance
the movement toward regional and international cooperation.
I.
The foregoing has suggested the need for searching analysis in-
to the question of how to promote understanding and accord in
those international contexts wherein the scientific and technologi-
cal element is an important decisional factor. At this historical
juncture, however, expectations, demands and evaluations of the
scientific and technological potential vary widely. One respected
commentator has said:
Our problem is that technics have established a rudimentary world
community, but have not integrated it organically, morally, or politi-
cally. They have created a community of mutual dependence, but not
one of mutual trust and respect.1 46
Though many may share this current appraisal, some are much
more optimistic for the future, as for example, the British scien-
tist, P.M.S. Blackett, who states:
I agree with those who hold that if the decade of the 1950's has been
characterized by the Cold War, the decade of the 1960's will be domi-
nated by competition in rates of social and material progress. It is not
the political system which can put the biggest satellite in orbit
which will win lasting honor, but that which provides the greatest
increase in human welfare.' 47
New technologies which are of great potential value to the emer-
146. NIEBuHR, Tm WORLD CRiSIS AND AmRcAN REsPONSMILITY
86 (1958). But see BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUM VALEs 89-90
(1956).
147. Blackett, New Science or Old Technology, 17 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 53 (1961). Consider also:
We should welcome this contest with the Communist world. We should
enter it eagerly. The liberty and dignity of man, equal justice under
law, freedom of expression and religion-all these are on our side.
These we have, as well as the technological skills that the underde-
veloped nations need so badly. While the Soviets can build cement
plants as well as we, that does not make them nine feet tall. Our
contributions include the Bill of Rights as well as technology. If we
mobilize the democratic world community behind a crusade for free-
dom as well as industrialization, we can dispel the myth of Com-
munist supremacy for all time.




gent countries, such as desalination of water, solar power, weather con-
trol, and nuclear power obviously have to be pursued.148
The suggestion has been made that technological advance has
an imperative quality, that it is an inexorable trend which, though
not necessarily decisive, is extremely significant in the modem
world. Technological development has enjoyed a steady climb since
the Industrial Revolution. Hardly the same can be said for uniform
political progress, at least by our standards.149 But there would
seem to be more objective means available for measuring the "best"
technology than for measuring the "most advanced" political sys-
tem. Roderick Seidenberg, however, in his interesting essay, Post-
historic Man, sees a continuing and irreversible movement from
instinct to intelligence in the development of man and of society-
a trend toward greater rationality, organization and predictabil-
ity."' This theme he equates with the scientific mode of thinking
and with its application to machines or technology. In Seiden-
berg's view, the general movement of society tends to be tech-
nologically determined with minimal significance accorded the
choice or value component. On the other hand, W. W. Rostow
asserts in The Stages of Economic Growth that even in a highly
industrialized society there is considerable area of choice in so-




148. Blackett, supra note 147, at 53. Not to be overlooked is the fact
that war technology does produce useful technological advances for peace-
ful utilization: development of nuclear weapons has created a new source
of electrical power, for example, and the missile program has been ac-
companied by significant advances in space exploration, knowledge in the
behavioristic and space medical sciences and highly developed automa-
tion, computer and telemetry techniques. The Chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics has predicted that the multi-mil-
lion dollar race to the moon will more than repay its cost by stimulating
new technological "indirect pay-offs." See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1962, p.
14, col. 2.
149. For example, the Nazi regime in Germany and the atrocities per-
petrated against the Jews. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1961, p. 21, col. 4. There
were 16,500,000 Jews in the world prior to World War II and 10,500,000
at its end according to this report.
150. See SEIDENBERG, POSTIISTORIC MAN (1950).
151. See RosTow, op. cit. supra note 24, at 126-31, 136, 144, 150. The
special significance of this proposition for lawyers and legal scholars has
been pointed out:
In this perilous epoch of threatened catastrophe legal scholars have
an opportunity of unparalleled urgency to assist in performing at
least two indispensable functions: the function of providing intelligence
and of making recommendations to all who have the will and capa-
bility of decision.
As old orders crumble and dissolve under the ever-accelerating
impact of scientific, technological and other changes, the future be-
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Technological innovations in many past instances have, unfor-
tunately, contributed to strife and conflict."5 2 Yet, such develop-
ments have also produced many multi-national arrangements.
Hence, careful thought should be given to expanding our efforts
toward such cooperative ventures through means of our scientific
and technological resources.
In the promotion of such an ideal [cooperation] I believe that
science has a vitally important part to play, for fundamental science
(the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake), together with techno-
logical science (in its application of this knowledge for the benefit
of mankind as a whole), may surely be regarded as one of the cul-
minating expressions of that cooperativeness on which depended the
genesis of the human form of society in the distant past. I do not mean
to imply that science among all other intellectual disciplines has a com-
plete prerogative in this respect, but I do suggest that it is in a
particularly favorable position to effect the closest contacts between
peoples who are otherwise divided by political and other interests. 153
Opportunities appear abundant and the prospects relatively en-
couraging, both within the framework of the community of West-
ern Nations and that of the United Nations.'54 There is urgent
comes increasingly plastic in our hands, holding out the possibility of
moulding a world order nearer to the aspirations of human dignity, or
of losing out to the most ruthless and comprehensive tyranny that
man has ever known.
McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems
of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 28-29 (1959).
152. From our own constitutional history consider the origin of the con-
troversy leading to the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton)
1 (1824) (steamship case), as discussed in CUSHMAN & CUSHMAN, CASES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314, 315 (1958):
[An achievement of science which had seemed destined to enlarge
the means of communication and develop the commerce of the nation
appeared rather to be embroiling the states in bitter antagonisms
and commercial warfare such as prevailed during the dismal period of
the Confederation. It is against the background of this intensely acute
economic situation that the case of Gibbons v. Ogden must be read.
153. Clark, We Must Exercise the Genes of Patience, Saturday Rev.,
Oct. 7, 1961, pp. 54, 55. While advance in cooperation is viewed by
some as an accurate measure of the progress of civilization, it may also in-
volve a new group orientation which submerges those values associated
with our individualistic heritage. Ibid.
154. See Haskins, supra note 36, at 228; Clark, supra note 153, at 55;
Revelle, Some Recent Lessons, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1962, p.
20.
The N.Y. Times reported on Dec. 17, 1961, § 4, p. 7, col. 7, that:
A significant step toward world cooperation in the peaceful uses of
outer space was taken by the United Nations last week when the 103-
member Political Committee of the General Assembly, including
Russia, unanimously approved a resolution calling for the internation-
alization of space and world cooperation in the use of space satellites
for the development of weather forecasting and communications.
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need, however, to employ realistic "models of change."' 55 In this
connection there appears to be a vast concept and technique po-
tential for the "amplification of intelligence" which is available for
exploitation by our policy planners.156 Non-violent alternatives to
war, cooperative or competitive, are in need of more intensive and
sophisticated treatment, making use of the most advanced sys-
tems of analysis.157 The related problem of creativity and innova-
tion requires more experimentation with new organizational forms
which will encourage the venting of new proposals for multi-
national cooperative efforts and provide for their informed and
critical evaluation.' We should neither remain indifferent nor
be dismayed with the assertion that as of this point in time "tech-
nological innovation has outstripped non-technological ad-
vances."
159
Every development in science and technology will not, of course,
provide a means for promoting improved international under-
standing. Such devices as the automobile, used and enjoyed widely
on an independent, personal basis, may provide an impetus to in-
ternational trade but probably contribute little to the type of multi-
national arrangements most urgently needed today. Activities which
require international control, regulation or supervision by national
governments, such as surveillance, weather, navigational and com-
munications satellite operations would seem to offer a much bet-
ter prospect for enlarging the scope of international cooperation
at a significant level of interaction. 6 The IGY served to em-
phasize that effective weather prediction and seismography net-
works depend for their effectiveness upon international coopera-
tion.
It would seem that eventually the nations of the world will find
The story suggests that internal U.S.S.R. scientific pressure for closer inter-
national cooperation in space activities overcame possible political objec-
tions. The Soviet Union had boycotted the meetings of the U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space during the two years of its existence.
155. See Boulding, supra note 14, at 7, with reference to "images of
change" appropriate to the contemporary international context. See also
FROMM, op. cit. supra note 62, at 251.
156. See the provocative article by Platt, Social Chain Reactions, 17
BULL. ATOMIC SCmNTISTS 365 (1961), which explores several concepts
which may prove useful in the analysis of social-political problems, includ-
ing the concept of "trigger operations."
157. See SNYDER & ROBINSON, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEci-
SION-MAKING (Preface) 17, 19 (1961).
158. Id. at 115.
159. Id. at 116.
160. See MICHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, for numerous suggestions in
this connection. See also Symposium on Legal Problems of Space Explora-
tion 587, 590 (1961), prepared for use of the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, United States Senate.
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need for conventions on such matters as the disposal of radio-
active wastes' 6 ' and liability insurance coverage for nuclear pro-
pelled ships and aircraft. 6 ' Probably, those technological devel-
opments 1) of obvious importance to human welfare and con-
venience and 2) requiring a high degree of cooperative action on a
multi-national basis-where a clear situation of interdependence is
involved-will present the more promising areas for exploiting
technology in gaining a higher order of international coopera-
tion. 63 With respect to nation states the problem may reduce to
the central task of locating the more obvious contexts for tech-
nological cooperation and then persuading the governments in-
volved that under such conditions cooperation or friendly compe-
tition is more rewarding than obstruction or violence.'6 A con-
tinuing reassessment of the utility of employing technological in-
novation toward this goal would seem to be amply justified if Pro-
fessor Quincy Wright's rather dismal evaluation of our past per-
formance is accurate. He has said:
It would appear that in aspiration statesmen have inferred from de-
veloping science and technology the need for the shifting of interna-
tional law in the direction of greater liberalism and humanism but in
practice they have sought to meet their problem by a more rigorous
application of national independence and power politics. Reviewing
the matter rationally, they appreciate the impossibility of this solu-
161. Concerning sea disposal of radioactive waste, see Release of the
AEC, January 5, 1961, regarding the testing of suitable containers for the
disposal of low-level radioactive wastes.
162. See Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Opera-
tions under § 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, March
31, 1961, p. 13, regarding maritime indemnity problems. There are, of
course, numerous areas for international cooperation open in the atomic
energy field. Various peaceful atomic applications are discussed in chapter
4 of the "Second McKinney Report," supra note 112, including: Medicine
and Public Health, Agriculture, Industrial Production and Control, Re-
search, Atomic Explosions for Civilian Purposes, and Thermonuclear
Power.
163. See International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(statement made in Committee I-Political and Security-on December 4,
1961, by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U. S. Representative to the Gen-
eral Assembly) and text of Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1721 (XVI),
adopted unanimously in plenary session on December 20, 1961. U.S. Dele-
gation Press Release 3875. For a review of the cooperative international
programs in space technology and exploration, see Special Issue on Space
Exploration, 17 BULL. ATOMIc SCIENTISTS 229, 233, 236 (1961).
164. See TAuBENFELD, op. cit. supra note 103, at 311; see also LAsS ELL,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 33:
mhe prospects of continued peace depend upon maintaining the ex-pectation among the elites of both camps that they have more to gain
by continued peace than by any alternative policy, and eventually
that they will gain more by extending the area of peaceful co-opera-
tion on a global scale than by war preparation. (Emphasis omitted.)
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tion, but tradition, emotion and uninstructed popular pressures over-
rule the dictates of reason. Looking over the world today, one is
obliged to record that in conducting international relations statesmen,
often following the dictates of peoples, have utilized the opportunities
offered by the new science and technology badly.165
Laying aside the omission to use or the irresponsible misuse of
scientific knowledge, technological innovation, and the scientific
orientation to the solution of social problems in the past, what con-
structive approach might be suggested for the application of the
scientific orientation and technological advance to current and
prospective international situations? Science and technology are
supposedly among the most potent of "unifying" forces. 6
The industrial society is world-wide. The science and the technology
on which it is based know no national boundaries; they speak in a
universal language. "[Science] is nonnational, non-local and, although
one would not say noncultural, singularly independent of the form of
government, the immediate tradition, or the affective life of a peo-
ple." There can be few technological secrets, at least for very long, as
the atomic field has well demonstrated. The industrial society is an
integrated world, to use Myrdal's phrase . . . .The factories and met-
ropolitan centers are focal points for the diffusion of industrial so-
ciety. It is a common experience that the metropolitan centers of the
world appear so familiar and so similar.167
A thorough analysis of the potential of the technological factor
for advancing international cooperation will involve the study and
application of such models as that of "pluralistic industrialism.'
1 6s
According to the architects of this model, it includes most, if not
all, of the more significant trends affecting the movement of so-
ciety today. It looks to such developments as: urban dominance,
the large role of government, and the elaborate organizational
structure of society.'
Industrialization creates vast urban areas; makes possible a great ex-
plosion of population; yields a new standard of living and leisure;
draws on new skills both social and technical; requires a vast network
of rules to guide and coerce men in the complex and interrelated
tasks essential to its successful growth; spawns new centers of organ-
ized power and furthers the concentration of authority in old centers,
particularly the state; forges new methods of attaining and retaining
this power; links men together in new chains of subordination and
invites frictions at each of the links in these chains; and provides
165. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 48, at 364.
166. See INDUSTRIALISM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 284.
167. Id. at 45.
168. Id. at 288.
169. Id. at 39-42, 282-88.
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a new culture based on mass tastes and mass consumption which
gradually overwhelms the many and varied preexisting cultures. 7 0
Industrialism, including its scientific and technological component,
being a strong force toward uniformity, does involve standariza-
tion of both thought and action to some degree in certain spheres
of activity, but "individualism" is by no means extinguished. The
authors of Industrialism and Industrial Man state:
Utopia never arrives, but men may well settle for the benefits of a
greater scope for freedom in their personal lives at the cost of consid-
erable conformity in their working lives.
Social systems will be reasonably uniform around the world as com-
pared with today's situation; but there may be substantial diversity
within geographical and cultural areas as men and groups seek to es-
tablish and maintain their identity. Society at large may become more
like the great metropolitan complexes of Paris or London or New
York or Tokyo, urbanized and committed to the industrial way of
life, but marked by infinite variety in its details.
Pluralistic industrialism will never reach a final equilibrium ....
The themes of uniformity and diversity, and manager and managed
which mark the world today will characterize it in the future as well.
There will be constant adjustments between these eternally conflicting
themes, but no permanent settlement. They will constitute the ever-
lasting threads of history: the uniformity that draws on technology
and the diversity that draws on individuality; the authority that stems
from the managers and the rebellion, however, muted, that stems from
the managed. These threads of conflict will continue when class war,
and the contest over private versus public initiative, and the battle
between monistic and atomistic ideologies have been left far behind in
the sedimentary layers of history.' 7 '
Whatever model or models-general or specific-are adopted as
working tools for projecting future developments, the relevant
questions become: Which of the trends involved promise to pro-
mote international cooperative efforts or non-violent competition
and should therefore be encouraged, stimulated, and reinforced
in whatever way possible? On the other hand, which trends and
conditions are likely to cause friction and conflict and therefore
should be kept within careful control and, if possible, restrained
or reversed?
In order to create useful models involving the operation of the
scientific and technological factor in the international arena, it is
first necessary to formulate more general concepts of the nature
and direction of social change.' 2 Such models as that of "pluralis-
170. Id. at 266-67.
171. Id. at 295-96. See generally MUMFoRD, ART AND TEcHNIcs
(1952).
172. See SNYDER, & RoBINsON, op. cit. supra note 157, at 88; Project
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tic industrialism" should be useful in this connection. Some find
our knowledge of the probable consequences of widespread so-
cial change not at all adequate at a time when most nations are at-
tempting to project ten to twenty years ahead. 3 From our na-
tional standpoint, the technological factor would presumably be
integrated into the framework of an over-all foreign policy strategy
including such considerations as promoting the new space sci-
ences, extending the peaceful uses of atomic energy, administering
technical assistance and economic development programs, seeking
favorable responses to arms control measures, disseminating as
broadly as feasible scientific and technical information and, in gen-
eral, planning programs calculated to promote the highest attain-
able degree of cooperative or non-violent competitive international
relationships.
The strong emphasis herein placed on "model" and "develop-
mental construct" formulation, alternative thinking, and the pre-
diction and analysis of consequences flowing from various courses
of action 74 does not ignore the possibility that uniform patterns
of multi-national relationships involving utilization of the techno-
logical element may not be found to exist in supposedly similar
contexts. Attempts to advance international cooperative action
may, at the negotiating stage, for example, have to proceed on a
basis which recognizes a certain uniqueness of conditions in each
specific relationship. Nevertheless, "the identification of sets of pos-
sible conditions and alternative reactions is perhaps feasible."' 75
Model structuring and projection lead to systematic exploration
of complex problems and require the type of thought processes
which suggest alternative courses of action and the assessment of
consequences. The very difficulty of the process of projection
should emphasize the increasingly greater intellectual burden re-
21-The Problem of Predicting Scientific and Technological Development.
In sum, the basic question is: What kind of predictions of scientific and
technological change are presently entertained by government offi-
cials and how are these being fed into the making of foreign policy
decisions? To the extent that such theories or predictions are inade-
quately based, we would assume important consequences for the
preservation of peace.
173. See id. at 59; Project 10-The Nature and Direction of Social
Change.
174.
The first question suggests that centralization of long range planning(goals and programs) will be futile in the absence of centralization of
analysis of consequences of short and long term U.S. decisions. So
far as we can see, no agency or unit in the government performs these
functions.
id. at 111.
175. Id. at 112.
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quired and the need for developing more effective analytical tools.
Models utilized for current appraisal of conditions and for the
projection of trends and future events should assist in dealing with
such inquiries as the following: 1) Under what conditions does
greater technological interdependence lead to cooperative action
and under what circumstances to increased animosities and strife?
2) How do the various nations assimilate the scientific-technologi-
cal factor into their national perspectives and decisional machin-
ery 76 and what is the effect on the national disposition to coop-
erate in utilizing the new technologies? 3) What are the potential
areas for technological development wherein a "self-enforcing"
feature exists such as in radio frequency allocation?"'7 4) How
does the disposition to enter into and conform to cooperative pat-
terns of activity vary with: a) the expectation of substantial
gain in living conditions? b) the expectation of rapid gain in the
satisfaction of material wants? c) the expectation of significant
gain in national prestige? 5) What are the most promising trends
in terms of promoting multi-national cooperative action which the
scientific and technological resource can be used to accelerate-
such as assistance in the process of industrialization? 6) What is
the relationship between the successful exploitation of the new
technology in given countries and the evolving trend toward great-
er "social justice" therein,"73 if such exists? 7) What impact does
the "subjective evaluation" of the great mass of people in various
industrially immature nations as to which groups within the coun-
try will benefit have upon their disposition to accept and encour-
age technological innovation? 79 8) What is the relationship be-
tween the capacity of a nation to assimilate various aspects of the
new technology and the stage of its own developing "scientific
revolution"? s8 9) What are some of the most promising forms
for the scientific and technological resource to assume to be most
effective in promoting international cooperation-as a joint func-
tional activity (atomic power), as a technological spectacular (hy-
droelectric installation) for assistance to newly emerging nations,
or as a segment of a complete socio-political-economic concept?
176. See id. at 92.
177. See id. at 101.
178. See Drucker, A Plan For Revolution In Latin America, Harper's,
July 1961, pp. 31, 36.
179. See Pye, Personal Identity and Political Ideology, 6 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 205, 219-20 (1961).
180. See Haskins, supra note 36, at 238:
Mhe new nations must develop an independent science. Without
some structure of indigenous, living science, they are likely to ex-
perience great difficulty in developing standards of judgment by which
to apprehend the whole scientific "style" of the natural world.
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10) Under what conditions should participation by a technological-
ly retarded nation in a given research and development program
be encouraged for the purpose of cooperative action?""' 11) In
what contexts does the sharing of research costs and burdens lead
to the disposition to accept rational, non-violent procedures at the
multi-national level? 12) In what contexts is the promotion of non-
violent scientific and technological competition a more feasible al-
ternative than an attempt to gain cooperative action?"8 2 13)
What technological contexts of multi-national interdependency give
promise of supporting a limited decisional structure for the pur-
pose of developing long range policy, promulgating rules, adjusting
competing interests and resolving disputes? 14) What relation-
ship, if any, does the degree and complexity of decisional in-
terdependency bear to the minimization of accidental or irrational
unilateral action? The last two questions suggest that in many
multi-national functional contexts a technological activity may of-
fer or demand a modest decisional structure for its management.
Furthermore, the thought might be entertained that conflicts of in-
terest and the need for dispute settling machinery should not be
viewed necessarily as a negative and wasteful function but as an
opportunity for promoting greater respect for orderly decisional
processes at the multi-national level. A gradually enlarging web of
such functional decisional structures (wherein the major trends
and conditioning factors come into play in specific decisional con-
texts) provides a productive alternative means of achieving a tol-
erable degree of international stability through a period of time
which can parallel the highy formal, top level approach through
the various proposed instruments for World Government.Y8 3
The foregoing questions are little more than a random sampling
of the types of inquiries which will arise in the course of exploring
181. MICHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 27, states that
an opportunity to participate in the U.S. space program may be seen
as a means for gaining or enhancing their own (underdeveloped na-
tions) international prestige and for training personnel in technologies
that would also be useful for other technical and scientific tasks of
value to national development. More needs to be known about the ef-
fects of space activities on evaluations of our humanity and usefulness
to other nations.
182. The possibility of conflict situations developing into ultimate co-
hesiveness and union is discussed by Singer, The Relevance of the Be-
havioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations, 6 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 324, 332 (1961).
183. Julius Stone views this proposition with some reservation. He tends
to take a mildly pessimistic view for the prospects of technological ad-
vance to contribute to international cooperative efforts. See STONE, QUEST
FOR SURVIvAL: THE ROLE o LAw AND FOREIGN POLICY 93 (1961).
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the effective use of the technological factor in furthering non-
violent international activities. While we must be content with
many relatively uninformed, short-cut decisions for the foreseeable
future, 14 any appreciable gain in the handling of international
affairs, especially that of employing the scientific and technologi-
cal factor at optimum effectiveness in promoting greater coopera-
tive efforts, will result from an increasing appreciation of the ap-
plication of the scientific orientation to the social process. As
Lundberg states:
[I]t is possible . . . to reach a considerable measure of agreement
regarding the probable costs and consequences of what man can and
may do in such a world. These costs and consequences may then be
calmly weighed in the balance of people's respective value systems.
Whatever choice we make under these circumstances win at least be
a deliberate and calculated action.
Such agreement on a method of reliable estimation of probable con-
sequences of man's action is exactly what is lacking regarding politi-
cal, economic, and social questions1s5
Obviously, an enormous amount of research is essential to the
implementation of a "scientific" approach to the solution of social
and political problems. 6 But a reasoned, systematic approach
to policy formulation is indispensable if significant improvement is
to be expected. The analytical framework must include at least the
following components with elaboration as necessary: 1) The spec-
ification of goal-objectives; 2) A description of the significant
contextual factors (including the demands and expectations of
the various participants, their available resources, and the practices
and institutions which can be employed in securing their de-
mands) and major trends and social movements; 3) The designa-
tion of alternative courses of action; 4) The projection of possible
outcomes for each alternative course of action; 5) The description
of specific consequences for each projected outcome; and 6)
The evaluation of such consequences in terms of the specified
value-preference scale. This type of analysis is designed to reduce
the chance element to a minimum. 87 It helps to delineate those
184. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26.
185. LUNDBERG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 127. See also McDouGAL, op.
cit. supra note 96, at 990.
186. See STRAusz-HuPE, KINTNER & PossoNy, op. cit. supra note 7, at
87, regarding the need for the study of the impact of technology on hu-
man behavior patterns with particular emphasis on the ability of people to
cope with the new "technological environment" with respect to effective
decision-making. And see MICHAEL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 25-27.
187. See Sears, Man and His Habitat: The Perspective of Time, 17
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTs 322, 323 (1961):
Science can do much to clarify values by reducing areas of uncer-
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areas in which information is needed; it requires the construction
of models of developing social activity upon which projections in-
to the future can be based with some degree of confidence; and
it involves an exhaustive consideration of alternative courses of ac-
tion as related to predicted consequences and to specific goal ob-
jectives."'
The difficulties in constructing and utilizing comprehensive
models of this type are not to be minimized. 89 But what choice
have we other than to do the best we can with available tools for
observation and analysis of human affairs and to apply the re-
sulting knowledge in predicting the probable development and
consequences of societal events?190 Only by knowing or making
the best possible estimate of conditions within the social-political
context can we hope to bring such matters within an effective
degree of control. Though members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in the function of predicting and projecting, the
type of model thinking discussed herein has received relatively
little organized and formalized attention in legal education. We
are finding, however, that a cross-disciplinary approach to socio-
political problem-solving has become a vital necessity. Certainly
the general orientation for productive contributions by those train-
ed primarily in the law can be improved through an early intro-
duction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various ap-
tainty, and this is the proper, but neglected function of science in po-
litical life. Any civil servant in Washington can tell of instances where
executives or legislators have been obliged to umpire situations that
could and should have been much more sharply defined by thorough
scientific spadework. (Emphasis added.) See also Boulding, supra note
14, at 12.
188. See McDoUGAL, op. cit. supra note 96, at 990. Of course projec-
tions may depend upon a sequential consideration of revised and interre-
lated models as well as a series of decisions. See RirNER, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 112-13.
189. "Most societies, leaders and led, have been incapable of adapting
themselves voluntarily and peacefully to fundamentally new conditions by
anticipating the necessary changes." FROMM, op. cit. supra note 62, at 4.
See Lear, Exporting the American Revolution, Saturday Rev., Oct. 7,
1961, p. 49:
We and the underdeveloped nations have learned, over a decade
of developmental efforts, that this transfer is very much more diffi-
cult and complex than we initially supposed. Conditions in the under
developed countries are very different not only from those which ob-
tain in the developed world but also from those which obtained at
the time of the industrial revolution.
190. See review of BATCHELDER, THE IRREVERSIBLE DECISION 1939-
1950 (1962) by Taylor, Saturday Rev., March 3, 1962, p. 18, wherein the
difficulty of prediction of complex sequences of events is discussed but the
thought is expressed by Mr. Taylor that we have no alternative but to em-
ploy the "calculative ethics" as best we can.
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proaches for handling such problems. Lawyers functioning at the
legal-policy level of decision should have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
today engaged in similar types of complex decision making.' 9 '
This paper has focused upon modern technological innovations,
requiring some degree of multi-national cooperation for their ef-
fective use, which might be employed to a fuller extent in fur-
thering regional and international cooperation. Constructs of fu-
ture developments have been emphasized as a means for defining
those conditions under which the technological factor might act
as a cohesive element in multi-national affairs, 92 or contrarily,
those situations wherein the technological factor may tend to pro-
duce tension and conflict. In the contemporary world, uncon-
trolled or misunderstood scientific and technological developments
can invite chaos by encouraging arbitrary, uninformed decisions
on complex matters of crucial importance. Hence, progress toward
a peaceful world order requires that we condition our thinking to
the major social movements and trends, including scientific and
technological advance, if we are to formulate useful constructs of
impending events and adopt appropriate future-oriented pro-
grams. 9 3 A systematic model-projection approach should also
lead to a more intelligent and creative application of the norms
and principles of international law to the over-all strategy for ad-
vancing multi-national cooperative efforts.' 94
191. The function of the scientifically trained in policy decision contexts
is receiving considerable careful scrutiny with the new prominence thrust
upon the scientific community as a result of the increased significance of
science and technology in international affairs. See Gilpin, Civil-Science
Relations in the United States (1961) (Paper presented to the American
Political Science Association Convention, September 8, 1961).
192. NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACCAL POLl-
TIcs 210 (1960), points out the range of difficulties involved in introducing
Western institutions and techniques, including technology, into non-Western
societies and urges that greater attention be given to the conditions under
which success or failure results.
193. LUNDBERG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 139, raises the question ofhow to bring about a Social-Scientific Revolution commensurate in impact
with that of the Industrial Revolution.
194. See Schachter, Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Pol-
itics, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1962).
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